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The central focus of this study concerns an evaluation
of various methods that have been utilized to provide for
structural improvements in the social, economic and political
conditions in depressed inner-city communities. This pro-
cess is referred to as "ghetto development".
After examining the broad range of definitions of
development and projecting scenarios of "developed ghettos",
the direction of the discussion turns to defining types
of development agents or entities that execute development
programs. Of those investigated, the study identifies
community-based agents that emerge from circumstances within
ghetto communities as the most viable and effective tool
for inner-city reconstruction.
The remainder of the study concerns an evaluation of
alternative resource organization pattersn (defined as
unbalanced and balanced growth strategies) that community-
based agents employ as a means of obtaining over-all
objectives. Towards this end, two organizations are
scrutinized in case studies. The emphasis of the analysis
concerns the relative advantages and disadvantages en-
countered while employing either unbalanced or balanced
growth strategies.
Although the case studies cannot provide extensive
enough information to determine whether one development
technique is uncategorically better suited for all develop-
ment agents and ghetto communities than the other, it does
provide insights into their relative effectiveness with
very specific situations and thus a context for viewing
the larger number of activities taking place in the field.
Thesis Supervisor: Langley C. Keyes, Jr.
Title: Associate Professor of Urban Studies and Planning
Page 3
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Page 4
GHETTO DEVELOPMENT
STRATEGIES:
AN EVALUATIVE ANALYSIS
Page 5
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction.. ................... ................ 7
Section One: Introduction......................... 13
Chapter I. The Problem of Definition............ 15
"The Collective Effort Strategies"........ ... 19
"The Nationalist Strategies".................. 24
"Black Capitalist Strategies"................. 31
Chapter II. The Developed Ghetto................ 45
Via the Collective Effort Strategy............ 46
Via the Nationalist Strategy.................. 50
Via the Black Capitalist Strategy............. 54
The Need for a Balanced Perspective........... 58
Via BalancedStrategies....................... 62
Section Two: Introduction......................... 66
Chapter III. Countertype Development Agents..... 67
"Origins of the Alien Agent".................. 69
"IAlien Itreto".............72
Concluding Comments on Alien Methods of
"Origins of the Indigenous Agent"............. 88
Chapter IV. Indigenous Intervention for Ghetto
Development.......... .. .. . ...... 93
"The Conflict Stage". ......... ....... 06.00. . 94
"From Conflict to Development: The Critical
Transition" ......... ...................... . 101
Chapter V. Development Techniques: Unbalanced
and Balanced Growth Strategies....... 112
Section Three: Introduction....................... 120
Chapter VI. Case Study - Tenants' Development
Corporation.. ....................... 121
Background Information........................ 121
Map I. The South End to Greater Boston.. 122
Map II. The South End Area.............. 123
Evaluation of Transformation Stage (In Light
of Choice of Growth Strategy)................. 128
Page 6
TABLE OF CONTENTS cont'd.
Chart I. TDC Administrative Structure..... 129
Chart II. TDC Resource Linkages........... 132
Ghetto Development Objectives................... 135
An Evaluation of Program Effectiveness.......... 138
Chapter VII. Case Study - Roxbury Action Program.. 147
Background Information.......................... 147
Map I. Highland Park to Greater Boston.... 148
Map II. The Highland Park Area............ 149
Evaluation of Transformation Stage (In Light
of Choice of Growth Strategy)................... 153
Chart I. RAP Administrative Structure..... 154
Chart II. RAP Resource Linkages........... 158
Ghetto Development Objectives................... 160
An Evaluation of Program Effectiveness.......... 163
Chapter VIII. Conclusion on Case Studies.......... 168
Per spec tus ........................................... 0 0 0 0 * 0 0 174
176
Page 7
Introduction
"Within the Black community at this very moment
are dozens of proposals, scores of ideas, all
focusing on the basic question of what are the
most promising techniques for bringing about
substantial improvement in the position of
Blacks in this country. Whites have a variety
of ideas, and Black folk even more. Reputations
and careers are built on this very topic. Pre-
sumably some of them have merit. All of them
cannot because many of them are mutually exclu-
sive or proceed from mutually contradicting
premises. But in the absence of any remarkable
wisdom as to which are more promising and which
are less, one is constrained to sample them
all... "1
--Julian Bond
Of the full range of proposals and ideas concerning
what direction the minority populations in this country
should take, this thesis examines one set of issues,
centering on the urban situation. In recent years, a great
deal of attention has been given to finding the means of
solving the problems of the nation's central cities.
Typified by their high concentrations of minority popula-
tions and depressed social, economic and political
conditions, the "inner-city" areas have been the subject
of intense discussion and debate. A series of questions
remain unanswered, concerning the causal factors behind
their formation; the reasons for their seemingly unwillingness
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to "go away" (despite the allocation of billions of
dollars in remedial action programs); and above all, what
must now be done to improve the lot of the prople who dwell
there. Alternative suggestions are plentiful and diverse -
spanning from plans that call for immediate dispersal to
plans calling for an all-out reconstruction effort. In
this study, I plan to investigate issues surrounding
recommendations that call for the latter plans.
The notion of "inner-city reconstruction" (referred
to as "ghetto development") implies a host of things to
different people. For example, the center city business
sector may envisage an effort that strengthens and expands
the economic base of the community; whereas the Black
politician, contrastingly, designs a plan that will increase
community cohesion and provide for greater political
solidification. Thus, it is essential that the concept be
clearly defined from the beginning. In the first section,
the problems of defining ghetto development are discussed
at length. From this discussion two things are accomplished.
First, a definition is proposed that reflects my perspec-
tive. Secondly, an evaluative criteria is constructed for
analyzing specific development methods.
The central focus of the thesis concerns alternative
techniques that community-based development agents utilize
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for fulfilling the task at hand. In Chapters III (3) and
IV (4), I define "development agents". Further, two types,
alien and indigenous, are characterized. These are entities
that execute development programs. I refer to them as
counter-type agents because they originate from opposing
forces and circumstances. The alien type is derived from
conditions outside of the ghetto. The latter emerges from
conditions inside such communities. I have assumed that the
Alien Agent is an ineffective tool for obtaining develop-
ment objectives; and it is discussed only to provide a more
dimensional interest for reviewing the Indigenous Agent.
After defining what ghetto development entails and
characterizing the types of entities (or agents) that
execute development programs, in Chapter V (5) certain
techniques of development are presented. More specifically,
the techniques under investigation concern the manner in
which Indigenous Agents organize themselves - their
organizational structure and resources - to obtain the
goals of ghetto development. As'shown, this is a critical
determining factor in whether or not the agent can maintain
itself as well as capably perform the tasks that await it.
I refer to the process ab balanced and unbalanced growth
strategies. In employing the unbalanced growth strategy,
the agent organizes its energies and resources to engage
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in a singular activity or project. In turn, this project is
utilized as a generation to stimulate over-all development
goals. Correspondingly, when employing the balanced growth
strategy, the agent organizes resources to engage in a
number of diverse activities or projects as a means of
providing for ghetto development. Briefly, the central
question of the thesis is which of these perspectives on
growth strategies is best suited to the tasks awaiting
Indigenous Agents.
Naturally, time and resources constrain me from
attempting to come to any universal conclusions as to
whether community or Indigenous Agents are apt to be more
successful when selecting the unbalanced over the balanced
strategy, or vice versa. What I am looking for, however, is
to gain some insight into which of the two strategies tend
to be more suitable. Towards this end I plan to make a
comparative analysis through reviewing two case studies.
One involves an analysis of a community-based agent that
has utilized the unbalanced growth strategy; and the other
is an analysis of one that has utilized the opposing
method, the balanced strategy. In order to strengthen the
validity of the study, I have chosen to review agents who
function in relatively similar situations. The first,
the Tenants' Development Corporation (TDC) is based in the
South End of Boston. This organization started its
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activities in the late 1960's protesting inadequate housing
conditions of Blacks and poor residents in the area. After
a long and enduring protest movement, the corporation was
given the tools required to develop its own housing. It
has used the activities in that area as the primary
generator of comprehensive ghetto development. Roxbury
Action Program (RAP), the second agent, is based in the
Highland Park district of Boston's Black community of
Roxbury. This organization initiated its program around
the same time that TDC began its actions. RAP also started
out in response to inadequate housing conditions. After
establishing its independence from the American Friends
Service Committee, it embarked on a development program
consisting of a number of diverse projects as its means
of effecting comprehensive change.
Thus, the thesis provides an opportunity to examine
two community-based development organizations - one
choosing the umbalanced strategy over the balanced growth.
The primary question concerns which organization has proven
to be more effective in producing improvements in their
respective community. Again, the evaluation will not
provide all of the answers concerning growth strategies,
but it can allow me to draw some conclusions on what
happened in two very specific situations.
Page 12
FOOTNOTES
lJulian Bond, "Foreward", Black Business Enterprise,
(New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1971).
2 Economists studying the problems of development of
underdeveloped nations have generated a theory of balanced and
unbalanced growth strategies. Although my concept of ghetto
development encompasses more than purely economic development,
for lack of better terms, I have chosen to borrow these. The
concept will be explained in more detail in the thesis. (For
more information see: Hirschman, The Strategy of Economic
Development ((New Haven, 1958)), Chapters 3-4; P.N. Rosenstien-
Rodan, "Problems of Industrialization of Eastern and South-
Eastern Europe", Economic Journal, 53 ((June-September,
1943)), 205; Ragnar Nurske, Problems of Capital Formation in
Underdeveloped Countries ((Oxford, 1953)), Chapter 1).
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SECTION ONE
Introduction
The foremost important step in carrying on a meaning-
ful discussion of ghetto development is to define the
subject. The term "ghetto development" implies action -
and calls for a host of conflicting goals, policies and
programs. The central intent of the first section is to
construct a definition of ghetto development that can
reflect the broad range of definitions that development
strategists have proposed, as well as one that can serve
as the criterion on which the organizations in the case
studies can be evaluated.
In the first chapter, entitled "The Problem of
Definition", I review the full range of definitions of
ghetto development. These definitions speak to the
strategies of development, or the means of accomplishing
development objectives. I have arbitrarily chosen to
categorize the definitions into three basic strategies.
The strategies are distinguished from one another from
the emphasis their authors have placed on either the
social, political or economic conditions in the ghetto;
and stress they have given the importance of formulating
policies and programs designed to remedy one of those
conditions, as opposed to the others.
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In the second chapter, entitled "The Developed Ghetto",
I first highlight the differences between the three strat-
egies. This is done through projecting scenerios, on what
reconstructed ghettos would look like - socially, politically,
and economically - should each of the three strategies be
utilized as the exclusive basis for a development effort.
Secondly, I propose my own views on ghetto development;
and present a fourth scenerio forecasting the new community
that would result should this strategy be put to work and
used as the basis of all development activities.
The presentation in Section I is designed to accomplish
two things. First, I have attempted to point out the sig-
nificant opposing views that presently exist in the field.
Secondly, I have pointed out where the opposing views
merge and have suggested my perspective on the correct
route to building a viable community from ghetto areas.
As mentioned, the thesis analyzes and evaluates the
activities of two development agents. The primary objec-
tive of the first section is to establish an evaluative
criterion. One that is both sensitive to the three
perspectives in the field as well as to my own position
on what ghetto development activities should entail. It
is within this context that the organizations examined
in the case studies will be evaluated.
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CHAPTER I: THE PROBLEM OF DEFINITION
Pethaps the most difficult task in undertaking a
study of ghetto development is to pinpoint a definition
that adequately reflects the conflicting views of those
involved in the field. Any attempt to implement a
development strategy that incompasses all possible
alternatives would immediately come to naught. This is
because some objectives inherently conflict with others.
Thus, it would be entirely impossible to generate
development activity through utilizing such an approach.
Before attempting to define ghetto development, some
comment is due on the two words themselves.
First a "ghetto" has traditionally referred to a
segregated community of Jewish persons. Such communities
were typical in European cities prior to the close of
World War II. As a result of its common usage during the
civil rights movement of the late Fifties and Sixties,
the term has been expanded to also describe: "A quarter
of a city in which minority or cultural groups live,
especially because of social, legal or economic pressure".
There are a series of problems encountered when
attempting to determine what constitutes a ghetto and
what criteria should be used in judging whether a particular
urban area can be identified as such. Though these issues
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are interesting and important, they lie outside of the
central focus of the thesis. However, it is appropriate to
mention some of the more common factors that indicate
ghetto conditions are prevalent in a given community:
1. Large concentration of racial minority
populations, usually Blacks, Puerto
Ricans, and/or those of Mexican descent;
2. Disorganized political conditions, char-
acterized by under-representation of
constituents in the main political pro-
cesses, inadequate political organizational
structure and minimal control over
infra-structure facilities and the delivery
of public services;
3. Depressed economic conditions, characterized
by low incomes, high unemployment rates,
poor housing stock, inefficient tax base
and relatively slow commercial and indus-
trial activity yielding low capital gains; and
4. Depressed social situation, characterized
by lack of community cohesion and high
crime rates.
For now, "development" should be seen as a cluster of
activities designed to alleviate or eliminate some or all
of the above type of conditions. Some strategists would
argue that all activity operating against undesired
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conditions should be considered a part of the over-all
ghetto development strategy. Others, of course, would
hold that few activities presently taking place could be
identified as such. In any case, a conditional factor
that most would agree on is that the activity should be
designed to remedy causal factors as opposed to merely
attacking observable symptoms.
After examining the full range of definitions of
ghetto development proposed by the strategists, I have
found it useful to classify definitions according to
three basic strategies. This chapter presents an over-
view of the definitions; and classifies them according
to whether social, political, or economic development
factors are placed at the heart of the over-all strategy.
In the first category, termed the "Collective
Effort Strategies", I examine definitions that emphasize
social aspects of development and stress the importance of
creating a new social order within the ghetto communities.
The mode of development is seen as one whereby all socio-
economic classes within the ghetto participate in the
development effort on an equalitarian basis. These
definitions demand programs that allow the "grassroots", or
poor, as well as middle-class ghetto residents to share
the responsibilities of decision-making and management
of affairs. The poor as well as the wealthy should share
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in the benefits the community might accrue as a result
of development activities. I have termed the second
category the "Nationalist Strategies". I point out
definitions that stress the importance of gaining poli-
tical control over all the institutions of the ghetto.
In this case, the primary issue is perceived as a racial
struggle between powerless Blacks and powerful whites. I
refer to the third category as the "Black Capitalist
Strategies". The definitions reviewed here emphasize the
economic aspects of development. Development is seen as
a process of creating and expanding black business enter-
prise through corporate investments in ghetto communities.
It is important to point out that the strategies do
not oppose one another in absolute terms; nor are they
mutually exclusive. Rather, each of the strategies
recognize a need for comprehensive development plans
encompassing social, political, and economic objectives.
The distinctions between them are made on which of the
three objectives holds the center stage of attention in
the over-all program. Through drawing distinctions along
these lines, I have attempted to shed light on the full
myriad of difficulties involved in defining the terms -
ghetto development.
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"The Collective Effort Strategies"
The Collective Effort Strategies are those that
emphasize the social aspects of the ghetto environment
over either the political or economic aspects. The pro-
ponents call for policies and programs that can enhance
the lower-class of the ghetto and given them in a
collective manner, the reins of political and economic
power. Rather than reconstructing ghetto areas in a
manner that is similar to other more viable communities,
the proponents of this strategy propose radical social
transformation. They stress the importance of allowing
ghetto residents, regardless of socio-economic class, to
participate in the development process; and to share equally
in the responsibilities of community, as well as in the
benefits that accrue from redevelopment. The need for
a collective effort, as the basis of ghetto development is
suggested by Thomas Vietoriz and Bennet Harrison in their
essay "Ghetto Development, Community Corporations and Public
Policy".1 The economist emphasizes a development process
that will build community ownership and control over the
social, political and economic ghetto institutions:
"For us, 'ghetto development' refers to an
over-all social and economic transformation with
a large increase in the diversity of higher
economic and institutional functions which
ghetto residents are capable of sustaining,
matched by a decisive improvement in the
cohesion of the ghetto community (in other
words, we are talking about institutional
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binding and not merely increasing the per capita
income). Specifically, we envisage the creation
of a number of 'inside jobs', acquisition by the
community of assets both inside and outside the
ghetto, a substantial expansion of existing black
businesses (particularly through cooperative
forms of ownership), the large scale transfer of
ghetto property to ghetto residents and commu-
nity qua community, emphasis on the promotion
of pre-vocational skills and training within
these ghetto enterprises, and local control of
community political institutions such as schools,
police, health facilities..." 2
Vietoriz and Harrison call for an "over-all social
and economic transformation" of the urban ghetto community.
Beyond calling for the more orthodox programs, e.g., job
creating and training, expansion of Black enterprise,
acquisition of ghetto property by ghetto residents, etc.,
they suggest a certain mode under which development should
take place. Among other things, the development must
build social cohesion, as opposed to merely increasing per
capita income of the residents. Moreover,~ the definition
calls for development strategies that will provide for
community or cooperative ownership of the end product (and
the processes towards reaching those goals). This
definition depicts a development strategy that would
allow the ghetto community to be reconstructed from a
process that is quite unsimilar to the method in which the
country's communities have traditionally either developed
or have been renewed. Also, the emphasis of community
ownership of development ghetto is again unlike the owner-
ship patterns that presently exist in viable urban
communities.
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Blaustien and Faux have also stressed the need for
collective effort development. In their documentary The
Star Spangled Hustle 3 , after making a sweeping indictment
of ghetto development programs initiated under the Nixon
administration, the authors point out:
"community development corporations represent
poor and minority people trying to pool their
talents and resources to create economic oppor-
tunities for themselves and neighbors. They do
not represent investors trying to maximize their
return on their investments..." 4
As in the former case, Blaustien and Faux propose
broad development programs. Here they indicate that
government and private enterprise must hold:
"...thus, there is a limit to the amount of
funds that they (poor and minority) can raise
in their own communities from outsiders for
business ventures. Therefore, they have to
turn to the federal government...and other
charitable institutions for sources of
capital.4. . 5
A more radical perspective of the collective effort
strategy is presented in the works of Black socialist
Earl Ofari. After bitterly attacking both the nationalist
and Black capitalist approaches, Ofari provides his own
definition of ghetto development:
"Planned economic development and control are
crucial for the building of some types of Black
community institutions ...Traditional business
enterprise, as has been shown, is simply not the
vehicle.. .reorganization of priorities demands
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that...energies of the 'grassroots' Black masses
must be organized and channeled.. Credit, capital
investment, as well as income distribution can be
equalized only through some mode of planned
sharing...business cannot be run, either by
individuals or corporately for the benefit of a
few...they must be community controlled and
operated...The production, distribution, and
marketability of goods....vital decision-making
processes must be expanded to include the full
range of Black participation..."b
Ofari's comments vividly depict the more radical
perspectives of the collective effort strategy. Development
is seen as a process whereby the residents of the ghetto
(that is the poor and minority residents) are given the
power to control the economic and political activites of
their communities. The masses in a socially egalitarian
way maintain control over the developed ghetto.
Opponents of the collective effort strategy dismiss
its more radical provisions on the grounds that they
lack a pragmatic basis. They argue that by utilizing a
collective effort approach, important modifications would
first have to be made in the larger political and economic
institutions in which the ghetto functions. Further, they
point out that the American power structure simply lacks
the flexibility required to allow it to accept principles
and arrangements that basically contradict the foundations
upon which it has been constructed. Further, some other
opponents question the ability of the "masses" to carry out
the role of full control in that they lack the knowledge
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and skill to do so. More criticisms of the cooperative
strategy will be forthcoming while discussing the nationalist
and Black capitalist strategies of ghetto development.
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"The Nationalist Strategies"
The Nationalist Strategies emphasize political prob-
lems in the ghetto over either social or economic problems.
The proponents of this strategy point out the necessity
of gaining political independence from the white power
structure as the means of achieving social and economic
freedom for ghetto communities. Here, the correct develop-
ment strategy is one that transfers political power from
the hands of whites to the hands of Blacks.
Emerging from the civil rights niovement of the
Sixties, Stokely Carmichael became one of the first
contemporary advocates of a nationalist development
strategy. Carmichael likened the Black community to an
"internal colony". In their documentary Black Power 7,
Carmichael and Hamilton analyze the ghetto situation as
one where Blacks have little control over the daily
events shaping their lives:
"The black community perceives the 'white power
structure' in very concrete terms. The man in
the ghetto sees his white landlord come only to
collect exhorbitant rents and fails to make
necessary repairs while both know that the
white-dominated city building inspection
department will wink at violations or impose
only slight fines. The man in the ghetto
sees the white policemen on the corner brutally
manhandle a black drunkard in the doorway...
he sees streets in the ghetto lined with un-
collected garbage and knows the powers which
could send trucks to collect the garbage is
white. When they don't, he knows the reason:
the low political esteem in which the black
community is held..." 8
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Nationalist oriented Peter Labrie also emphasized
the control aspects of ghetto development. While refuting
Kain's ghetto dispersal theory, Labrie depicts the
nationalists' strategy towards development"
"To remove these constrictions does not imply
a large scale displacement and removal of ghetto
blacks to the suburbs...the problem then is one
of creating conditions which remove the political
and economic constrictions on existing ghettos
and encourage their inhabitants to assert them-
selves in the control-and management of their
community environment. Such control and manage-
ment are at the very heart of the black struggle
to achieve a wholesome and decent life..." 9
Unlike the proponents of a collective effort
strategy, the nationalist approach assumes that the
social and economic arrangements inside of the ghetto
are basically functional and viable. The central problem
is to remove white political controls which prevent the
social and economic institutions from functioning in the
interest of ghetto constituents. The following passage
reflects this view:
"Ghetto rebuilding is seen as a process already
at work in efforts by black community groups to
attain control over various governmental business
and educational activities within ghetto areas.
The proposals for rebuilding consist simply of
recommending long-range organizational forms
towards which these efforts should be directed if
blacks are to attain control over their community
environment...1"10
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Numerous forms of utilizing a nationalist strategy for
ghetto development have emerged throughout the years. Some
have been a response to Carmichael and Hamilton's Black
Powerl; others have evolved quite independently from
that approach. One method that is receiving more attention
is promoted by the Honorable Elijah Muliammad and the Black
Muslims of America.
The Black Muslims have implemented economic develop-
ment programs in a number of urban ghetto areas. Although
the long-range objectives call for complete geographic,
political and economic separation from the United
States, their ghetto development strategies are designed
to bring immediate benefits to members, as well as other
ghetto residents.
In Politics Among Nations, Hans Morgenthau defines
political power as "the psychological control over the
minds of men".12 Indeed, the most significant achieve-
ment of the Muslims has been their ability to instill
the political concept of Black nationhood into the minds
of their membership. The concept of nationhood has served
as the primary motivating force behind their economic
development program.
The Muslims perceive the Black population in the
country as a nation.1 3 Thus, depending upon the popula-
tion's location (either urban or rural), each individual
Page 27
has certain tasks to fulfill in developing the "Nation of
Islam". Briefly, their development s'trategy combines an
agricultural base that produces basic goods; and an urban
market to distribute and market the goods. Ghetto develop-
ment, among other things, is seen as a process of encouraging
and strengthening the agricultural-urban market system.
The process provides jobs, as well as services and goods,
while at the same time increases the assets owned and con-
trolled by Muslims (and therefore the Black community).
To indicate the necessity for political independence,
the Black Muslims refuse to accept financial or other
support from whites. All of the capital that has been
made available for their economic program has been generated
by members of the Nation or from donations given by the
Black community. In this manner, the Muslims have stressed
the importance of rebuilding communities.
Overall, the Muslims plan to develop parallel
institutions that provide Black communities with an entirely
separate governmental institution. They hold that Black
Americans must reject all aspects of American or Western
society and embrace the Islamic Religion (as applied to
their distinct situation) . 1 4
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The Muslims' approach to ghetto development has re-
ceived attention from all quarters. The successes of the
Nation of Islam, through utilizing a self-help, self-
determination approach has generated new interest in from
various development strategists. The usually conservative
Black Enterprisel5 magazine remarked:
"In recent years, the Muslims have compiled a
record of economic achievement that has won
grudging respect even from critics who pre-
viously dismissed them as anti-white separatists.
The Muslim philosophy has not changed, but their
fortunes have...Today their financial holdings,
though modest, demand a new assessment."16
Despite favorable comments given their economic pro-
gram, the Muslims' approach has been rejected by many
development strategists (that both support and oppose
the nationalist perspective). First, it is argued, that
the theocratic power structure on which the Nation of
Islam functions denies personal freedom to members (which
includes a denial of democratic procedures - the Nation's
activities). Secondly, the Muslims are accused of holding
a Black racist position against whites; and ultimately
seek physical confrontation with the American power
structure.
The collective effort development strategy attacks the
nationalists on the grounds that it accepts or at least
condones the present socio-economic structure. They point
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out that nationalists only desire to place institutions
that exploit ghetto residents into the hands of Blacks
(and not necessarily the Black masses). Earl Ofari
criticizes Carmichael and Hamilton's work Black Power17 on
those grounds:
"According to them (Carmichael and Hamilton), any
merchant operating in the Black community should
be prepared to "reinvest" 40 to 50 percent of
their profits in that community. They are
apparently prepared to allow merchants who are
busily engaged in the economic blunder of- the
Black community to keep up their activities as
long as they agree to share a certain percentage
of the spoils with the Black community...
Carmichael and Hamilton, by their giving approval
to the present structure of ghetto economics, i.e.,
the merchants' exploitation of Black workers,
reveal a certain unawareness regarling basic
capitalistic economic practice..*" L
Beyond the attacks launched by collective effort
development strategists, the Black capitalist architects
also-denounce the nationalist perspective. Black
capitalist protaganists maintain that the nationalists
attempt the impossible. The urban ghetto cannot be
politically or physically separated from the over-all
American structure. Programs designed to do so are
impracticable because they fail to recognize the need to
include the resources and experienced government and private
enterprise in the reconstruction of the ghetto. Moreover,
they argue that the "ghetto problem" is not a problem
either caused or shared by Blacks alone. Rather, the
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ghetto problem is an American problem; and can only be
solved through activities that include the efforts of all
concerned. Moreover, that solution is part of the larger
political process and not adrift from it.
The nationalist strategy differs from both other
perspectives in that it emphasizes necessarily a racial
issue over all other factors. Ghetto development is seen
as a process where the chief task concerns the political
struggle of Blacks to gain full control of matters effecting
their lives and environment away from the hands of whites.
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"Black Capitalist Strategies"
Black Capitalist Strategies emphasize economic con-
siderations of the ghetto environment over social or
political factors. Ghetto development is defined as a
process of formulating massive amounts of capital in the
nation's ghetto economies. Proponents of this strategy
call for policies and programs that will significantly
strengthen and expand the Black business section of the
ghetto community. Through accomplishing these ends, the
ghetto economy can be integrated into the national economic
structure; and Black businesses can then provide the
resources of over-all ghetto development.
Proponents of the Black capitalist effort have called
upon government and private enterprise to make special
provisions for the urban ghetto which would stimulate its
economy and ultimately provide access to the mainstream
economy. Unlike other ethnic groups, they point out that
the Black community, for a number of reasons, was never
given the opportunity to awaken its economic potential
and compete in the mainstream system. Social critic
Harold Cruse points out:
"The Black economy idea is neither myth nor
concrete reality. The ingredients exist and
merely await skillful organizational use and
application. America is a nation that abounds
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in many myths and many realities. The greatest
myth is that of democratic capitalism. Minorities
could not have won their way into different levels
of economic status if it were not through some form
of group economics - either capitalistic or
cooperative. Some added group politics (the
Irish), and others even used group crime (the
Mafia), and its reward as the key to economic
respectibility. The American Jews could not have
won their way into the economic power they now
possess if not through various forms of group
solidarity. For reasons too numerous to explain
here, the American Negro, especially in New York,
has failed to learn and practice his economic
group.responsibilities in the promised land of
the North."19
The Black capitalist strategy is one of pragmatic
economies, as opposed to more idealistic programs that
demand radical shifts in social and political power arrange-
ments or requires Black communities to separate from the
mainstream national operations. Schuchter emphasizes
the pragmatism of the Black capitalist strategy:
"The pragmatic question for blacks should become,
'How can the current maldistribution of income and
economic power in American society be remedied
without seriously infringing on the prerogatives of
the supercorporations, the ideology of the business
system and the rewards of more privileged groups
in the economy?' "2 0
The Black capitalist strategy calls upon Black
enterprise to carefully examine the political situation
(as it exists) and exploit that situation, wherever
possible, for economic advantages. The key requirement
in this approach is to increase the flow of capital into
ghetto communities in order to make Black enterprise a more
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viable institution. Only after the risks of investment
can be reduced, can such areas be made profitable for
further investment. Strong Black enterprise will provide
the necessary medium to create desired changes in the
ghetto environment.
The thrust of the Black capitalist argument is
simply that ghetto development is the process of providing
a means of rebuilding the central city economy by rein-
forcing and expanding Black enterprise. Once developed,
Black enterprise can then provide jobs, and profits to
alleviate the critical political and social ailments in
the community. Theodore Cross defined Black capitalism
as follows:
"...The strategy which argues the creation of new
jobs and profit centers inside ghetto area. The
program also seeks to transfer the ownership of
ghetto businesses from whites to Black control, at
the same time building in the ghetto new banks,
insurance companies, production and service
facilities. Today Black capitalism is an
insignificant economic force in America."21
An important feature of the Black capitalist
strategy for ghetto development is that present capital
in the ghetto simply cannot compete with the massive
capital assets of private enterprise. Urban planner
Arnold Schuchter presents a vivid description of this
problem:
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"Most blacks grow up on what can be described as a
pre-capitalistic society within America. Dis-
connected from the American business system and
environment, their understanding of the workings
of white American capitalism probably is not much
greater than their knowledge of Communism in
the Soviet Union. At the same time, even with-
out much understanding of the economic workings
of American society, black militants realized the
virtual impossibility of radical economic and social
changes in American capitalism in the foreseeable
future, such nationalization of supercorporations,
redistribution of concentrated wealth, or re-
direction of the main flow of national economic
activity away from market forces toward priority
social areas..."22
It has been argued that the reasons behind the
relatively insignificant involvement of the Black commu-
nity in the larger economy stems from historical and
contemporary racial discrimination, as well as economic
exploitation by white government and private enterprise
against Blacks. The Gary Black Political Convention's
mandate spoke to those issues charging:
"The economic impoverishment of the Black
community in America is clearly traceable to the
historic enslavement of our people and to the
racist discrimination to which we have been
subjected since 'emancipation'. Indeed, much
of the unprecedented economic wealth and power
of American capitalism has obviously been built
upon this exploitation of Black people." 2 3
The argument continued that those who have been
responsible for such discrimination and exploitation
through either design or neglect, must now "pay" for
their past actions. Urban economist Robert Browne
carefully outlines the basic reasons and objectives of
the demand for reparations to the Black community:
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"1. To punish (or expiate) the white community
for the sins of slavery committed by its
ancestors and oblige it to pay retribution
to the descendants of slaves;
2. To provide the black population with resti-
tution for the unpaid labor of its slave
ancestors;
3. To redirect to blacks that portion of the
national income which has been diverted from
blacks to whites as a result of slavery and
post-emancipation racial discrimination;
4. To provide the black community with the
share of the national wealth and income which
it would by now have had if it had been treated
as other immigrant communities were, rather
than enslaved.
My list is illustrative rather than exhaustive,
and there is some overlap among some of the
suggested objectives.,24
Although the supporting ideology of the Black
capitalist position can be traced far into the annals of
American history, the decade of the Seventies has
generated a number of new leaders and programs along these
lines. Black capitalist proponents have adopted numerous
strategies for both receiving and utilizing reparations for
development purposes. Seemingly, three basic designs have
been formulated:
1. Direct transformation of capital to Black
enterprise;
2. Transfer of presently white controlled corporate
assets to control by Blacks;
3. Government intervention aimed to assist and
expand existing Black enterprise.
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In a shocking demonstration before the large
racially integrated Grove Church in New York, civil rights
militant James Foreman delivered the "Black Manifesto",
addressed to "The White Christian Churches and Jewish
Synogogues in the United States and All Other Racist
Institutions". Prepared by the National Black Economic
Development Conference held in Detroit in April of 1969,
the mandate called upon the churches to deliver a sum of
$5,000,000,000 in reparations to the Black community for
participation in the continuing exploitation and dis-
crimination of the Church against the Black community.
Also, the Manifesto called for a number of agencies to
be established to deliver the funds to urban ghettos, as
well as poverty-stricken regions of the rural Black
South.25
The Manifesto signaled the initiation of a trend on
the part of the Black community to solicit reparations from
the white community to pay for racial discrimination and
to provide needed resources for capital formulation in
minority communities. From this point, the demand for
reparations took on various forms calling for programs
and activities that would develop the ghetto.
One interesting proposal on reparations suggested by
Richard America, called for the strategy of literally trans-
ferring a representative percentage of white corporate
assets to the hands of Black businessmen in the community.
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America presented the proposal in an essay entitled
"What Do You People Want?" The rationale behind this
approach is su mmarized here:
"The belief in the myth of rugged individualism;
the espousal of Black individualism while forgetting
the history of public support for whites special
economic interest; the general ignorance of U.S.
history - these attitudes...are vividly held by
whites...The establishing and nurturing of small
businesses, now being undertaken on an increasing
scale, does not satisfy the need for significant
economic independence and self-determination...
only large enterprises will satisfy that require-
ment and they take a long time to develop.
All large businesses in the United States, with
the exception of two or three, are owned and
operated by whites. If relative economic parity
is to be reached in one generation, some must be
transferred to Blacks..."26
America makes himself quite clear, contending the
strategy which provides the most direct route of Black
participation in the over-all economy would be to change
the hands of some corporate power from white to Black.
Though some considerations have been given to this
approach, neither the government or the private sector
has taken significant steps towards adapting policies of
this nature.
The conservative era of the Seventies, characterized
by the Nixon administration, reviewed the major domestic
spending of the poverty programs sponsored by the Kennedy-
Johnson administrations and vehemently attacked many of
them on the grounds that they failed to produce significant
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change in the urban ghettos. Further, the Republican
administration seemed to advocate a new role for govern-
ment
Rather than direct intervention, the government should
use its powers to bridge the gap between corporate America
and the ghetto. The object of the new approach would be to
encourage corporate investment in the inner-city, as
opposed to merely continuing to spend federal dollars- on
poverty programs. A number of leading militants from the
civil rights movement perceived the new federal direction
as a potential new means of constructing a Black capitalist
effort. Among such men was Roy Innis, Executive Director
of the Congress on Racial Equality (CORE)2 7 . In a white
paper entitled "Separatist Economics: A New Social Contract",
Innis presented his and the views of CORE on how the Black
community should work with government and private enterprise
to create new opportunities in ghetto communities. In
critiquing Innis' position, Blaustien and Faux remark:
"Innis thinks that black ghettos such as Harlem
were in many ways similar to underdeveloped
countries. But since the ghettos lack political
boundaries that would permit them to protect
their own industries, they needed to create
special protections to assure the loyalty of
black consumers and to assure that the profits
will be used in the best interest of the
black community...
Why should the white establishment help blacks
attain independent power? Innis' answer: 'Enlightened
self-interest on the part of those who hold real
power in society'. Not liberal politicians, or the
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labor bosses...but the corporate businessmen, who
have a greater stake in avoiding racial warfare..."28
The proposed new coalition between the government,
Black capitalist and the American corporate structure
would be needed to provide the capital to develop ghetto
communities. Through initial corporate "risk" investment,
aided by government incentives, resources would be
available to solidify and expand Black enterprise. The
profits made from the reinforced enterprise could be used
to strengthen the economy of the ghetto as a whole, and
make it even more profitable for corporate invesement (by
removing risk). Thus, an upward spiral effect would take
place that would eventually evolve the ghetto economy into
the mainstream economic system.
The opponents of the Black Capitalists Strategies
contend that the expansion of the ghetto's business sector
is simply not enough to create the kinds of changes required
to improve community life for all ghetto residents.
Further, they argue that the Black Capitalist approach
ignores.important political and social considerations
operating both inside and outside of the ghetto structure
that must be modified before or during the redevelopment
process.
Some opponents condemn the new relationship that Black
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Capitalists have proposed between Black enterprise and
the national corporate structure. That relationship is
viewed as al alliance in which Black enterprise will be
given a greater portion of profits (accumulated from
exploiting the Black community) in exchange for allowing
white business to gain a greater economic hold over the
urban ghetto. Moreover, opponents content that Black
Capitalist Strategies will only create greater internal
conflicts within the ghetto by significantly increasing
the gap between the Black middle-class and the larger, less
fortunate lower classes. Such factiqnalisms, it is argued,
will inadvertantly destroy all vestiges of community
social cohesion and political unity.
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Conclusion
The definitions of ghetto development I have reviewed
speak to strategies of development. These strategies have
been categorized into three distinguishable perspectives;
each emphasizing one aspect of the community - either the
social, political or economic - over the others. Corres-
pondingly, the definitions call for a different set of
goals, policies and programs reflecting the most important
objectives of a particular strategy.
An interesting question arises. What kind of community
would result should ghetto communities select only one of
the three strategies and utilize it as the exclusive basis
of a development effort? That is, how would the various
aspects of community life be characterized? In the
following chapter, I examine this question. I have
constructed scenerios on what the reconstructed ghettos
might look like if any one of the three strategies gained
universal acceptance and was utilized as the basis for a
nation-wide ghetto development effort.
The scenerios do not reflect ideal communities.
Rather, they reflect what I consider to be "unbalanced"
reconstructed ghettos, in the sense that the strategists
have ignored what was occuring in other aspects of the
community environment while concentrating their energies
on improving one condition. Following, I present my views
on a viable developed ghetto.
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CHAPTER II: THE DEVELOPED GHETTO
In this chapter, I present my views on what con-
stitutes the correct route to reaching the Developed
Ghetto. I also project a scenario that illustrates the
social, political and economic characteristics of the
transformed community. This scenario indicates what the
ghetto should look like after my version of a develop-
ment effort obtains all of its goals. The scen rio also
depicts what I consider to be a balanced combination of
the three strategies outlined above.
Before presenting a picture of the desired Developed
Ghetto, I first construct three other scenarios designed
to portray exaggerated versions of Developed Ghettos.
These scenarios are pessimistic forecasts, projecting my
perspective on what would happen should only the pro-
visions of one strategy - either the "Collective Effort
Strategy", the "Nationalist Strategy" or the "Black
Capitalist Strategy" be used as the exclusive basis of a
development program implemented on a national level. The
purpose of presenting them is to point out the crucial
fallacy in implementing strategies that emphasize one
aspect of development while failing to give equal consid-
eration to the others. The scenarios illustrate the kind
of Developed Ghetto that development efforts are not
attempting to build.
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The Developed Ghetto Via the Collective Effort Strategy:
Scen ario I
The thrust of the development effort had been to
radically improve the social characteristics of the ghetto.
Now all aspects of community life evolves around insuring
every resident political and economic equality. The
egalitarian qualities of the Developed Ghettos throughout
the nation stand as a model for the communities that
surround them. All social and economic classes have been
destroyed. Residents have equal status, equal wealth and
they collectively participate in the decision-making
processes and management of community affairs. Before
the great transition there had been social disorganization
and a lack of a sense of community. All that has passed
now - but the architects of the new social order have paid
a heavy price for the egalitarian society. Residents have
been stripped of all vestiges of personal freedom; and
economic poverty runs rampant. Yet the community functions
as one.
The political machinery functioning within the
ghetto before the transformation has been abolished. In
its place, the community has restored a form of pure
democracy similar to that found in ancient Greecian times.
All citizens are required to meet daily at the public
forum to participate in the community assembly. Here, the
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laws and policies of the Developed Ghetto are formulated
through a non-representative-pure democracy process. The
political clout of the new community is weaker than before.
This is primarily because of the inefficiency of the
political system and the poor leadership of the administra-
tors of law. The development strategists had insisted
that the only fair selection procedure was one that
afforded every resident an equal opportunity to administer
political affairs. Thus, leaders and representatives were
chosen by drawing lots. Each year the names of all adult
members of the community were submitted at the assembly;
the first ten persons whose names were drawn at random
would serve as the governing council. All were considered
qualified. The banality of the over-all system impedes
the ability of the community to influence and compete
in the national political structure.
Individuality and non-conformity are viewed with
adamant distaste. Persons who fail to participate in the
political process are banned from the Developed Ghetto.
Perspective newcomers from surrounding communities are
barred entrance if they refuse to submit to the will of
the collective.
Though the wealth of the Developed Ghetto is dis-
tributed on an equal basis, there is little to share.
Businesses representing national corporate interest have
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fled the area rather than submit to the new economic
policies implemented by the strategists. Most persons
having professional and technical skills have also left.
During the development effort, the ghetto economic
structure had been modified to reflect the new order of
things. Community residents and institutions were required
to turn over their properties and other assets to the
public treasury. Now what little wealth there is has
been redistributed to all residents. Development strategists
decreed that all workers, regardless of the nature of their
task should receive equal amounts of pay. Moreover, new
employment laws require employers to hire perspective
workers on a first-come basis, regardless of the skills
they possess. The policies had been designed to eliminate
every possibility of employment discrimination based on
socio-economic position or differences in abilities.
Further, privately owned businesses are prohibited. Resi-
dents are not allowed to engage in any activity that might
bring personal gain. For these reasons, the area's
enterprise has faltered and it fails to provide either
goods or services for the community. Employment oppor-
tunities are also scarce. Yet the unemployed receive
equal benefits with those who can find work.
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The Developed Ghetto has created a new life for
community residents. There are no class conflicts,
social strife is non-existant and all persons are eager
to share their few possessions equally. Yet despite the
egalitarian qualities of ghetto existence, life is more
difficult than before the transition. Those who acquire
useful skil.s and can afford the costs usually leave in
search of more prosperous places. Those who resent the loss
of personal free' and individuality also flee; few are
willing to pay the price that the classless society
demands...
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The Developed Ghetto Via the Nationalist Strategy:
Scenario II
The nationalists had won their hard-earned struggle.
It had been decreed: all white citizens should evacuate
ghetto areas; simultaneously, all Blacks and other non-
white citizens had been ordered to return to and remain
in territories under control of the new Black government.
All efforts in the Developed Ghetto have been concentrated
on establishing a separate political system. Before the
transition, the ghettos had strived to participate in
the over-all political and economic structure. The
attempt had failed. Now the Developed Ghettos have to
support their separate political base and its community
from its newly constructed economy. The "dark nation"
consists of a loosely connected string of city-states.
All traces of the former white masters have been removed.
Two nations - one black, one white - exist side by side,
each within the geographic boundaries of the other. The
boundaries of both are patrolled by armed guards; each
keeps a wary eye on the other while attempting to overcome
the problem of survival.
The transition period had been a difficult one. The
strategists had planned to maintain the same type of
political machinery that had existed when whites moved
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freely through the ghetto communities. However, damaging
conflicts emerged between political parties and communities
over what direction the Developed Ghettos should take.
Many residents argued for a re-unification with the white
power structure. Opponents insisted that the dark nation
must forge a new path. Various parties continuously
attempted to upset the democratic processes. The transi-
tional phase had almost brought on a civil war. On an
over-all basis, the Developed Ghetto presented a united
front against the white political structure. But internally,
political turmoil was rampant; and social cohesion non-
existant.
Ultimately, the military was forced to take control
of the government. Through their regime, the voices of
opposition and dissent have been silenced. The Developed
Ghetto's political structure denies the community residents
the freedom of expression and thought that they once
enjoyed prior to the transition. Economic conditions within
the Developed Ghetto have also taken a turn for the worse.
During the transitional period, the nationalists had
seized control of all properties and assets formerly con-
trolled and operated by whites. The plan, of course, was
to turn the commercial and industrial activities over to
Blacks. Cumulatively, the expertise of professional and
technically trained residents was sufficient to operate
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the newly acquired enterprise. However, serious problems
have resulted from shortages in raw materials required to
produce the goods and services that meet even minimal basic
needs of the Developed Ghetto's residents. Communities
having access to such commodities are forced to sell them
to other ghettos at exorbitant prices because of the
scarcity of supplies and the costs involved in trans-
porting them through the white communities. In addition,
economic activities have also been hindered as a result
of inadequate communications networks, power shortages and
the lack of other basic infra-structure facilities due to
the white power-structures' decisions to sever the delivery
of such services to the Developed Ghettos.
The tremendous economic difficulties confronting the
Developed Ghettos have resulted in serious enough problems
to endanger the very survival of the new political system.
The military-controlled government simply cannot deliver
goods and services to residents at a level that even
resembles the inadequate supplies available before the
transition. Residents are hungry; they lack ample
clothing. The housing stock continues to deteriorate.
The costs of political independence has included the loss
of personal freedom and deprivation of the basic necessities
of life. There is talk that the Developed Ghetto must
negotiate with the white power structure; others argue that
existing resources should be mobilized to wage war against
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the external powers that continue to oppress the Developed
Ghettos through their economic sanctions...
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The Developed Ghetto Via the Black Capitalist Strategy:
Scenario III
All energies of the development effort had gone
towards strengthening and expanding the ghetto's economic
base. During the transition, ghettos had amassed large
amounts of capital required to advance the extent of their
commercial and industrial activities. That objective had
now been actualized. Now the economic structure of the
Developed Ghettos throughout the nation have become firmly
embedded into the greater economic system. For the first
time in American history, Blacks are producing goods and
services inside these communities at margins that easily
allow ghetto enterprise to compete with nation-wide busi-
ness corporations.
Within the Developed Ghettos a constant state of full
employment is maintained. The annual employment averages
are better than averages found in communities surrounding
the ghettos. The Black middle-class has achieved new
heights in affluence. All has contributed to the pro-
gression of the national economy. Major corporations that
had once shied away from establishing businesses inside
ghetto areas now plead for the opportunity. Business is
booming. Everything has been achieved through the
sacrifices that have been made by the growing lower classes
of the Developed Ghettos. Their blighted position has
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deteriorated to an even worse state than before the
transition.
The strategists of the grand design have turned back
the time clock - the community environment is now similar
to what had existed during the era of the nation's capitalist
expansion. This had been done to simulate a climate
within the Developed Ghettos similar to the type of society
that existed at the turn of the century. The purpose, of
course, was to re-create an atmosphere that could serve as
a spawning ground for bountiful economic growth and
development. Through their policies, the strategists have
attracted major corporations to invest in the ghetto
economy and have also increased the profit margins of the
once-faltering Black enterprises.
The masses of ghetto residents, the workforce, has
been stripped of all labor rights common to the day and age.
Development programs have been designed to create a large
pool of semi-skilled and unskilled workers. For example,
the average work day has been increased from eight hours
to twelve. The rights of workers to unionize, child labor
laws and work-safety regulations have been abolished. The
strategists have imposed ceilings on permissable wages
at levels far below the national average. All has been
done to attract labor-intensive businesses into the
community and to reduce the overhead costs of Black enterprise.
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In effect, the new laissez faire policies operating inside
the ghettos have produced the impetus necessary to for-
mulate massive sources of capital in the once economically
depressed community.
The strategists have also been forced to deny ghetto
residents consumer protection provided populations out-
side its boundaries. First, residents are required to
purchase only those goods and services produced by
businesses operating within the ghetto. Further, all laws
regulating the quality of manufactured goods have been
abolished. Investors are thus allowed to sell their sub-
standard stock to community residents at costs far above
prices that even quality stock can sell for in communities
outside the ghetto. In addition, residents are discouraged
from taking legal action against producers distributing
faulty or dangerous products. A new era of' "let the buyer
beware"is prevalent.
Though the life of the Black middle-class has
improved tremendously, the lower classes suffer. Rigid
"work-fare" laws have been imposed. Unemployed men,
women and children are ordered to report to community labor
camps each day. There, all, excepting the most aged,
the crippled, and the maimed, are forced to work on pro-
jects consisting of the lowest type jobs. The unemployed
who fail to report to the camps, in light of the tremendous
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new employment opportunities made available, are refused
even minimal forms of public assistance.
The poor have also felt the brunt of the new anti-
crime policies. Severe crime prevention tactics have been
introduced to keep the streets safe for legitimate busi-
ness. The community police have been invested with new
authority to take all necessary measures against
criminals. Those arrested, usually members from the lower
classes, are given minimal due process rights; and when
convicted are sentenced to long and harsh punishment.
The strategists' policies have destroyed the little
social cohesion that existed before the transition. Resi-
dents feel that opportunities exist for those who.are
aggressive enough to take them; and the most important
policy for acquiring wealth and status is that each man
must go for himself.
The Black middle-class looks down on the poor with
disgust. They blame the poverty-stricken masses for
creating their own condition by failing to take advantage
of the prosperous times. The upper-class has taken an
enlightened perspective of the new society. Some members
have gone so far as to establish private charitable founda-
tions to assist the poor. Many feel that the time has come
to implement new social reform programs to improve the
conditions of the masses...
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The Need For A Balanced Perspective
No doubt the three strategies of development, outlined
in the previous chapter, when removed to their most pro-
nounced state, would present as a whole, conflicting per-
-spectives on the Developed Ghetto. The projections I have
forecast in the above scenarios reflect the appearance of
transformed communities, constructed from the extreme
provisions of each strategy. I reiterate the fact that the
illustrations have been presented to point out why I feel
it is important to define development in a manner that
gives equal emphasis to the social, political and
economic aspects of community life.
Until now the discussion has emphasized the points
of conflict between various strategies. Before continuing
it is only fair to point out where the diverse strategies
merge. Obviously, none of the scenarios presented thus far
reflect the development strategists' conception of the
Developed Ghetto. Rather, the definitions reviewed in the
previous chapter, on which the scenarios are based, repre-
sent the depths of their search for viable solutions to
the burdensome and complex problems confronting a specific
segment of the urban center's population and institutions,
referred to as "the ghetto".
I plan to present a fourth scenario on the Developed
Ghetto. This projection represents my views on what the
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ghetto should look like after the reconstruction effort
has been completed. Moreover, it describes, in my
opinion, the type of community that the strategists (des-
pite their many disagreements) are in actuality attempting
to define and construct. I define ghetto development in
the following manner:
First, the need for development implies that something
is not developed or is under-developed. I submit the
"something" is the fact of the social, political and
economic systems of the ghetto which collectively comprise
the structure of the community. It is because the systems
of the structure are "under-developed" that problems
and undesirable conditions arise. For example, the under-
developed economic system means that there is an
inefficient tax-base in the area; unemployment is high;
the businesses are faltering; and the infra-structure is
not supported, etc. Ghetto development is aimed towards
alleviating such problems through developing, improving
and strengthening the systems (that is, the over-all
dynamics of economic events taking place inside of the
ghetto). Moreover, I contend that all three systems
must be developed. To develop only the economic system is
"economic development" but not ghetto development. To
develop the political system is "political development", not
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ghetto development, etc. The intent of "ghetto development"
is to improve on each of the systems and develop them
to the point that the problems and undesirable conditions
in the community stemming from under-development are
remedied.
I would contend that ghetto development activities
must be evaluated on the basis of whether or not they can
provide for comprehensive positive change. Within this
framework, development agents can be comparatively eval-
uated on their ability to deal effectively with improving
the full three systems of the ghetto structure. The
"ideal" or most effective agent is one that meets those
requirements. Minimally, the agent must be able to improve
(or develop) at least one system, without exasperating
conditions in another system. The ineffective agent is
one whose activities fail to improve or
strengthen any of the systems - social, political or
economic - and yet at the same time manages to impair the
existing conditions in one or all three. As mentioned, the
development agents analyzed in the case studies will be
evaluated by this criterion.
I will now present the fourth scenario of the Developed
Ghetto. This projection reflects a transformed community
resulting from an implementation strategy designed to
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improve the full three systems of the. ghetto and thereby
provide comprehensive change in the over-all environment.
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The Developed Ghetto Via Balanced Strategies:
Scenario IV
The Developed Ghetto has resulted from a carefully
planned and skillfully executed series of policies and
programs. Each realm of community life, the social,
political and economic, have been developed in a manner
that has improved the existence of all community residents.
The social aspects of the community are different from
before the transition. It is not a classless society,
but all of the socio-economic groups have contributed to
the effort in some way; and all share in the benefits
of the task. Residents readily identify with community and
actively participate in public affairs. Some members of
the Developed Ghetto have more wealth and wield greater
power and influence than others, but few residents are
denied the basic needs required to live decent lives.
The crime rate in the community has been greatly re-
duced since the transition. Wide-spread rehabilitation
programs have been implemented to assist the problems of
drug addiction and other conditions that had led to many
members of the community's survival through illegal
activities. Residents have taken a harsh stand against
community and outside perpetrators who continue to endanger
the well-being of the Developed Ghetto.
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Politically, the Developed Ghetto wields more poli-
tical clout than ever. Nationally, the ghettos have
remained part of the American political processes. But
the larger power structure has recognized the legitimate
right of the Developed Ghetto to participate on a more
equal basis in the political decision-making processes
affecting the national interests and policies. Internally,
the community power structure has won the authority required
to control political factors affecting the lives of its
residents. Public services in the Developed Ghetto, such
as schools and police, have been placed under direct
community control.
The Developed Ghettos do not win all of their
political battles against the government or surrounding
communities. The primary improvement that has taken
place is that they are now in a stronger position to
bargain and compete for their own vested interests. The
political base has been strengthened and solidified. The
new communities have demanded the respect and gained the
power required to force the nation, as a whole, to be
responsive to its problems and needs. For example, racial
discrimination and strife has not ended. But in the new
society, persons engaging in discriminatory activities
are considered criminals. Violators are quickly brought
to justice and given severe penalties.
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The economic character of the Developed Ghetto has
also changed dramatically. Outside investors are allowed
to invest in the area, but their businesses are carefully
scrutinized by the community to insure that economic
exploitation and discrimination are at a minimum. Also,
residents are encouraged to engage in private business as
well as collective ventures. Masses of capital have not
been formulated overnight. The process is an on-going one.
Yet, in the Developed Ghetto, the collective and individual
wealth has significantly increased since days gone by.
During the transitional period, the strategists had
introduced programs to uplift the over-all educational
qualifications of the community. Residents, old and young,
were offered new opportunities to learn relevant skills
and professions. Families were provided adequate incomes
while the heads of households and children engaged in
relevant work-study programs designed to increase skills.
The process has been a slow and costly one. But now
national corporations invested in the community because its
people held the kinds of skills that business and industry
demand.
The ghetto economy remains tied to the national
economic system. White enterprise is allowed to operate
inside the ghetto communities; and Black enterprise out-
side. The entire business sector has been charged with the
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responsibility of using a portion of its profits to
contribute to the collective good of the community.
Correspondingly, it is also allowed to accumulate reason-
able profits for itself.
The Developed Ghetto is similar to other viable
communities. There is a greater sense of social cohesion.
Political conditions have been improved to the extent
that the community now had the ability to effect change
and the progression of things, as do other communities.
Economic conditions are far from perfect. But now, all
residents have been given opportunities to learn pro-
fessional training and skills required to allow them to
make decent incomes; and engage in meaningful work. There
are wealthy residents as there are less wealthy ones. But
poverty and blight no longer run rampant through the
lives of the people. Many things still need improvement,
yet...
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SECTION TWO
Introduction
Thus far I have examined the kinds of communities
that ghetto development efforts might be designed to
create; and identified one that reflects what I believe
to be the most viable type of Developed Ghetto. The means
of achieving that goal involve two issues: the develop-
ment agent that can bring about the Developed Ghetto and the
development techniques available to that agent.
Chapter III, "Countertype Development Agents", pre-
sents my view of the development agent concept. Chapter IV,
entitled "Indigenous Intervention for Ghetto Development",
distinguishes the origins of community agents.
Chapter V examines two techniques of development
(which I refer to as "growth strategies"). I review the
theories behind "unbalanced" and "balanced" growth
strategies; and point out forseeable advantages and dis-
advantages these opposing theories present to community-
based development agents.
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CHAPTER III: COUNTERTYPE DEVELOPMENT AGENTS
From my perspective, ghetto development activities are
executed by one of two types of development agents. By
"development agent", I refer to an entity possessing an
organizational structure, resources and a decision-
making mechanism, one that intentionally sets out to
improve the over-all social, political and economic
systems of the ghetto environment. I refer to the first
type as the "Alien Agent". This is because it emerges from
forces and circumstances that rest outside of the boundaries
of the ghetto conmunity; and the resources of such agents
are also controlled and supervised from that point. The
second type is the "Indigenous Agent", the community-
based operation.. It is the countertype of the former in
that it emerges from forces inside of the comunity; and
correspondingly, the development resources are controlled
and supervised by ghetto interests. As mentioned in the
thesis introduction, our central concern is with the
community-based organizations, the Indigenous Agents.
I believe, however, that in order to fully understand the
issues confronting its operations, it is essential to
first point out the characteristics of its countertype -
and show how they have failed to be successful tools for
inner-city development.
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First, the fundamental similarity between the agents
is that both implement development activities designed to
improve the ghetto structure. Beyond this similarity,
they are mutually exclusive in every respect. The Alien
Agent intervenes into the systems from points outside its
structure (it introduces development activities into the
community as a result of circumstances occuring outside),
whereas the Indigenous Agent emerges from the ghetto. In
other words, development activities are stimulated from
circumstances from within its structure.
The two development agents necessarily use counter-
type approaches because the entities themselves originate
from opposing sets of circumstances. Here it is
appropriate to mention that because of their unique
circumstances, they have encountered significantly
different experiences while implementing development
programs. Moreover, as a result of their countertype
positions, each agent possesses certain advantages and
constraints not shared by one another. These matters are
examined in specific detail later on in the section.
Right now, my immediate intention is to trace the origins
in which they are conceived.
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"Origins of the Alien Agent"
First, I suggest that government and private enter-
prise (including corporate charitable foundations and some
private concerns) serve as the source of the Alien Agents.
I refer to these parties collectively as the "traditional
power structure" because they direct and govern the affairs
of the nation. As urban ghetto areas are part of their
domain, the traditional structure legitimately functions
to regulate all activities within it. As well, it
distributes resources to all communities and provides
various services. When conditions warrant, this structure
may introduce programs explicitly designed to improve
the over-all systems of ghetto areas. The implementation
mechanism is the Alien Agent. Its programs and activities
of development are authorized by the traditional structure;
and the resources required for the action are con-
trolled by that source. This will mean that the initial
decision to intervene, the decision-making processes and
the resources of activities are all determined by the
governing structure - the alien source.
The initial decision to engage in activities is
dependent upon a number of things. Most often, forces
within ghetto communities have used their influence to
pressure the power structure to do so. Sometimes action
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is initiated as a result of pressure exerted from differ-
ent points within the structure. In other cases, the power
structure (or a member thereof) initiates action from its
own desire to remedy problems in a part of its domain.
In any case, the important factor is that development
activities emerge from the "will" of the power structure.
It possesses the legitimate resources and thus the power
to intervene.
The key distinguishing factor of this approach is
that the ghetto is only indirectly involved in the event.
This is because the resources of the effort are controlled
by the traditional power structure. Therefore, action
takes place with or without the approval of the community.
Decisions can be made without community approval. More-
over, the action is carried out by an agent with or without
community participation. On all fronts, the
Alien Agent holds the option to either permit or deny the
community a role in the development program. Thusly, the
entity executing the development program is an Alien
Agent because it is created by forces outside of the
community; and the resources required for action also
come from that point.
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There have been numerous development activities intro-
duced into inner-city communities from this type of
approach. I submit that such efforts have failed. Two
examples of government-sponsored development activities
that were in effect, Alien-type intervention models are:
the "War Against Poverty Program" sponsored during the
Johnson years. The second program is the Boston Urban
Rehabilitation Program (BURP), sponsored by the Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development. Both efforts are
classic examples of Alien intervention programs that
failed.
Page 72
"Alien Interventiorfl':
A. The War Against Poverty
It has been argued that the singular most important
event shaping government domestic policies since the late
Fifties has been the occurance of the non-violent civil
rights movement, led by Dr. Martin Luther King. Billions
of dollars have been spent by federal and other levels of
government, as well as private enterprise, in an attempt
to solve conditions highlighted during the movement that
were perceived as short-comings in the American political,
economic and social structure.
The central contention of that movement's protagonists
was that government, particularly the federal echelons,
should directly intervene on behalf of its under-represented
constituents (at that time, Blacks) to remedy certain
discriminatory practices in the South; and thereby serve
as the chief catalyst for social reform. As the civil
rights movement in the South erupted into the "long hot
summers" in the urban centers of the North, government was
again called upon to bring relief to dismal conditions
experienced by minorities and the poor.
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For whatever reasons, the federal government supported
by the American people recognized the call for action; and
assumed the responsibility of providing new welfare for the
disadvantaged. The legal intervention initiated from
events during the Kennedy years, evolved into the poverty
program in the Johnson years. An example of intervention
during the Kennedy Administration is the dramatic show-
down between federal and state sovereignty. Political
scientist, James Sundquist reminds:
"In May, 1961, Robert Kennedy dispatched 600
United States Marshalls to Alabama to protect the
'freedom riders' after they had been attacked
by mobs in that state. A year later, federal
marshalls escorted James Meredith when he regis-
tered at the University of Mississippi and troops
were sent to put down riots on the campus...
Suddenly, in the late Spring of 1963, in Birmingham,
it became clear to the President, to the Congress,
and the nation at large, that they could not wait
for an endless series of local decisions, produced
only by agony in the streets...across the South.
The Negro cause demanded, and justified, a sweeping
national decision that would settle the question
of equal rights for all cities, for all regions,
for all time."1
President Kennedy legitimized his decision to take
direct federal intervention based on a reluctant precedent
set by the Eisenhower Administration in the "Little Rock,
Arkansas Affair". The federal government intervened.
directly into the domain of state and local government
in order to assist the lacking position of Southern Blacks.
Although this action cannot be defined as a ghetto development
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effort (in that the issues were focused on the South and
the intent was not really to improve, comprehensively, the
total Black community), it is mentioned here because in
part, it served as a significant new precedent for the mode
of a ghetto development effort later taken by the Johnson
Administration. As Sundquist points out, mostly through
agony in the streets, Blacks produced the conditions which
allowed the federal government to intervene into the
community. However, other than creating the situation, the
Black community was not involved directly into the inter-
vention activity. Rather, that activity had its origin
outside of the community. Furthermore, resources were
controlled by that outside force.
The creation of a series of anti-poverty programs,
such as the Office of Economic Opportunity and its Commu-
nity Action Program, was an example of direct intervention
affecting the urban centers of the North. Although not
explicitly defined as such, the War on Poverty, designed
to "break the poverty cycle" was in effect an attempt by
an Alien Agent (this time the federal government) to
impact in a comprehensive manner, the social, political,
and economic systems of the ghetto structure. As Sundquist
points out:
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"The urban ghetto had become,.indeed, the crucial
testing ground of the President's conception of
his Great Society...there all of the programs designed
by the activists...would undergo their trial by
ordeal and succeed or finally fail. The urban
ghetto had become the central challenge, in the
nation's domestic affairs, to every element of
the political community - to the intellectuals,
who must analyze the problems and develop the
solutions... "2
In addition, the :strategy -of -the effort was to
simultaneously attack a number of diverse problems. This
would be done, of course, through organizing the resources
of the effort into various programs aimed at remedying a
broad spectrum of social, political and economic problems.
For example, the Office of Economic Opportunity would pro-
vide new economic advantages- to minorities and poor; the
Community Action Program (CAP) would facilitate the
amelioration of the political situation of the ghetto; the
Head Start Programs would improve educational oppor-
tunities, etc. The target was, indeed, the over-all ghetto
environment. The intent was to attack the so-called
"poverty cycle" at as many points as possible until the
cycle was finally broken (or within the terminology we
have used, the ghetto environment was developed). George
Shipman comments on this strategy:
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"Remedial action based upon this view of poverty
aims at breaking the cycle (of poverty) at as
many points as possible; the breaking of the cycle
permits escape. Because basic causes and acquired
attributes resulting from over-exposure to poverty
are interlocked, a broadly proportioned, even
random strategy is acceptable. Targets of oppor-
tunity are as effective as pinpointed remedial
steps. Given sufficient resources, the breaking-
up of ghettos, the development of broad employment,
the stimulation of motivation and aspiration, the
encouragement of self-organization and of problem-
solving efforts can be counted upon to build towards
a cumulative effect."3
Not only was the effort in the form of direct outside
intervention, but it was also designed to improve the
environment through a multiple program approach.
Unlike the intervention during the Kennedy Administra-
tion, the "War Against Poverty" did not require that the
residents set the stage for intervention. Federal
legislation accomplished that. But, the residents did have
to participate in the development processes. One of the
important policies of the program, termed "maximum feasible
participation of the poor", called upon the development
agents to include residents in their affairs. This was
especially the case with the CAP programs:
"In addition to involving the poor in staff
positions, the Community Action Programs have,
usually under prodding of OEO, sought to
increase participation of the poor at the level
of advisory councils, which, with varying degrees
of responsibility, the choice and implementation
of programs..." 4
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The impetus, however, for intervention was derived
from outside of the community. As such, the.federal
government controlled the resources required for program
implementation. Residents were allowed to participate
because it was the government's policy and not the fact
that residents had the right to participate. Moreover,
participation by the poor did not mean they could direct
the activities. Or control the resources.
The "maximum feasible participation" policies created
a series of fundamental problems in the poverty program,
particularly with the community action program effort.
Nathan Glaizer sums up the rationale behind the CAP
strategy:
"Ideologically, the Community Action Program is
based on the analysis of what ails the poor. The
analysis asserts that it is not their obvious
material lack which is the heart of the problem.
It is their lack of power. The vote does not
give them power, because it needs education,
money and time and social and organizational
skills to organize the vote and the poor do not
have these. The balance is to be redressed by
community organization. The effect, it is hoped,
will be...through the increase of power to
change the pattern of rewards and services dis-
tributed by public agencies...it is designed to
evoke a distinctive response in each community...
it is a grand design, not simply of democracy
at work, but of democracy trying to stimulate the
response that makes it work better..." 5
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However, by attempting to increase the political power
of the poor or the ghetto residents, the action was also
upsetting the political calm in municipal governments.
Inevitably, the federal government found itself in a
predicament. On one hand, it was representing the
interests of the poor's struggle to make government more
responsive to their needs; and on the other, it was weakening
its own position that rested upon the support of municipal
government, particularly in the big cities. Eventually,
forced to capitulate to organized political machines, the
ghetto residents became embittered by'what they saw as a
double-cross. Commenting on the program's top administrator,
Sargent Shriver, Andrew Kopkind pointed out:
"Community Action is dying in Shriver's office.
Big city mayors are allowed to consolidate their
control over local programs. In Mississippi...
last year's segregationists are this year's
moderates, and they are commandeering the anti-
poverty projects to keep an upper hand over
restless Negroes. The disinterested outsider
can sympathize with Shriver's administrative
problems, for the political pressures on him
are enormous. But the poor owe him no special
considerations; he is bucking under and they
are sore."6
Saul Alinsky's essay entitled, "The War on
Poverty - Political Pornography", vividly sums up the
position that the poor in the nation's cities grew to hold
when the government was ultimately forced to make a
decision that it could not represent the poor at the cost
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of losing the support of the organized political machinery
of city governments. More than anything, the poor felt
betrayed and questioned the very intent of the government's
initial intent in introducing the effort:
"The anti-poverty program was publicly launched
in the wrappings of nobility of purpose and yet
with a certain dedication that smacked of
sanctimoniousness. Unless there are drastic
changed in direction, rationale and administration,
the anti-poverty program may well become the
worst blunder and boomerang of the present admin-
istration...Today the anti-poverty program is
emerging as a huge political pork barrel, a
wielding of anti-poverty funds as a form of
political patronage. Its disguise as a
war on poverty is thin and clumsy. The use
of this kind of money for this purpose is
particularly repulsive... "7
In this instance, failure was the outcome of efforts
to improve the urban ghetto through activities originating
from outside of the community; and where resources were
controlled and distributed by the government. Poverty
had not been eliminated, the ghettos remained unimproved
and the poor were left even more alienated from the
greater society than before. In their study of the
poverty program, A Relevant War Against Poverty, Kenneth
Clark and Jeanette Hopkins conclude that the primary
reason for the failure stemmed from who controlled the
purse strings of the effort:
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"When one seeks to speculate about the reasons
for this general ineffectiveness', a number of
factors emerge. Foremost among them is the fact
that the community action programs attempt to
bring about regulated changes in the conditions
of the poor by organizations financed by federal
and local governmental agencies controlled by
elected or appointed political officials. The
factor of political control is inevitable; it
is not likely even in the most effective of
these programs that political and governmental
officials will permit any type of program or any
degree of intensity of community action program
which would directly or indirectly threaten the
maintenance of their own political power...The
federal government's instrument of power in
influencing community action programs has been
money. Appropriation has made possible the
establishment of programs, the indirect control
of programs, and the curtailing of programs..." 9
The authors go on to conclude:
"The goal of obtaining meaningful, sustained, and
positive changes in the conditions of the poor
would seem to require the identification, develop-
ment, and use of techniques through which the
latent power of the poor is mobilized on their
own behalf without interference of government..."10
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B. The Boston Urban Rehabilitation Program
The second example involving a development effort
emerging from outside of the community and where the
resources of the development activities were not controlled
by inside forces is the Boston Urban Rehabilitation
Program (BURP). The program was sponsored by the Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development. The intent of the
effort was to attack one problem in the Boston Black
community of Roxbury - the housing conditions.
The BURP effort was initiated from the desire of HUD
to indicate to important .national political figures .that.
massive rehabilitation of inner-city housing stock was
feasible and that an .attempt to do .so could be carried out
in an efficient and expedient manner. The program was
planned in haste and in a cloak of secrecy.1 1  For a
number of reasons, HUD saw the necessity of involving as
few persons as possible in the planning stages. The
foremost being of course to keep the prices of the area's
housing stock from sky-rocketing, due to speculation.
In any case, the Roxbury community was not informed that
the program was in the making nor were they involved
in the initial planning stages.
When publicly announced by Secretary Weaver, the Black
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community adamantly opposed its implementation. Even
though the program would provide critically needed adequate
housing for large numbers of disadvantaged families in the
area, it was rejected from the stand-point that the commu-
nity had not been allowed to participate in its formulation.12
HUD may not have recognized the far-reaching implications
that a program of this magnitude would have on the over-all
environment, but the community leadership and residents
did. They argued that implemented effectively, the
program could favorably impact the entire area. It could
mean community ownership of significant assets; new employ-
ment opportunities for the areas unemployed; expansion of
community Black enterprise; and increased community cohesion
and improvement of the social environment.
The pressure exerted by the community forced HUD to
initiate a second planning stage. This time the community
would be involved in the program's formulation and
implementation. The initial initial of HUD to indicate
that inner-city rehabilitation could be accomplished
swiftly was obviously lost. In addition, there were
additional costs resulting from having to re-draw program
plans. Beyond that, HUD, while trying to aid the
community, had managed to increase its alienation from the
more powerful forces that govern its domain. In his
political analysis of the BURP effort, Langley Keyes
points out:
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"One of the clearest flaws in the BURP model was
that it provided no means of communication with those
who would be most effected by the program - the
tenants themselves. Nor did it tap those Roxbury
organizations whose programs included a concern for
housing by seeking their advice or requiring their
services..."13
The failure of BURP was not that the program failed
to rehabilitate housing - this was ultimately accomplished.
The failure was the process itself. Direct action - non-
participatory action, sponsored by forces outside of the
community - prohibited necessary communications between
residents and sponsors. Because of this, the architects
of the effort had failed to realize that a venture of
this nature could potentially serve as a tool, positively
impacting more extensive aspects of the ghetto environment.
In this instance, outside agents, because of their lack
of insight into the over-all concerns of the community,
failed to serve as effective agents of intervention.
Again, the processes of development failed because of
the source of its emergency; and of who controlled the
resources of the effort.
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Concluding Comments on Alien Methods of Intervention
The above examples illustrate the sort of failures
that government has experienced when attempting to for-
mulate and execute intervention action designed to develop
ghetto communities. Needless to say, there have also been
some limited successes resulting from these efforts.
Beyond this, the question arises, what has been the
rationale behind these attempts? I think that the foremost
reason goes back to the events taking place during the
civil rights movement of the Sixties. It is only fair to
emphasize the fact that the leaders of the Black community
in time of grave crisis called on the federal government
to assist them in impossible situations. The conflict in
the South concerned civil rights - a matter over which the
federal government had final word. And, because of its
willingness to favorably respond (when all other legal
apparatus ceased to function properly), the Black community
turned to Washington for assistance. Secondly, the greatest
wealth of resources and expertise was concentrated in the
hands of forces outside of the ghetto. Indeed, it was
because depressed urban communities had so few resources
that intervention was required in the first place. Finally,
it was the responsibility of government to respond to the
blighted conditions of the urban central cities. once the
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Black community successfully gained the government and the
nation's recognition of its extensive problems, the country
had a moral and legal responsibility so binding that it had
no other alternative but to lead the struggle for community
improvements.
Naturally, the second question that must be addressed
is why did these efforts fail? Particularly in the case of
"the War Against Poverty", the federal government had
attempted to unleash its own power against itself. This
conflict of interest inevitably led to internal strife
between the different levels of government. Though
political considerations warranted this, an effective
approach in the South, the powerful Democratic political
machines of the urban cities presented a whole other
problem for the Democratic President. If nothing else,
"the War Against Poverty" effort exposed the depth of
the ghetto's problems and the fundamental modifications
in the national power structure ghetto development
demanded. As Clark and Hopkins pointed out - the
kinds of changes ghetto development required - changes
in deep-rooted social, political and economic power
relationships between the ghetto and the outside - suggests
that those outside forces cannot be called upon to do the
job that development required; and that action and resources
of development must emerge from inside the community.
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Finally, by controlling the resources of development,
despite the approval or disapproval of the indigenous
residents, the government ultimately determined what the
ghetto community wanted and needed. But, as in the case
of the BURP effort, the halls of government (with its ivory
tower-educated analysts and planners) oftentimes misunder-
stood the problems and the needs, and thusly misinterpreted
what action was required.
In that these efforts have failed, the question be-
comes, can the ghetto, with all of its special problems, do
a more effective job than the former agents of inter-
vention? And, further, what methods should they seek to
accomplish their ends?
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"Origins of the Indigenous Agent":
In my discussion of the Alien Agent, I suggested
that government and private enterprise (the national
corporate structure) collectively control the traditional
power structure. These parties function to regulate
the national activities, including the affairs of the
ghetto. Along these lines, I also suggest that there
are activities taking place within the ghetto that can
be classified as functioning independently of the
traditional power structure. These activities serve
exclusively the interests of the community. Examples of
organizations involved in such activities include
neighborhood associations, civic groups, ghetto business
organizations and civil rights agencies. These agencies
are operated and controlled by indigenous populations and/
or institutions. Although their resources may come from
outside of the community (from the private sector,
government, etc.), the organizations supervise the
resources and direct them towards matters and projects
of their own concern. Their collective activities
create an "informal power structure". Necessarily, it
functions as an advocate of community self-interest in
that it is the power of the community.
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The informal power structure holds a subordinate posi-
tion -to the traditional power structure. As mentioned
above, the rightful role of the latter is to regulate
the affairs of state (which include governing the
affairs of the ghetto). This also implies that it is
responsible for providing for the welfare of the ghetto
community. For example, when problems arise too large
to be handled by the residents of the community, then,
via the informal power structure, they must exert
pressure on the traditional one to impel it to inter-
vene and utilize its resources to remedy the situation.
The community, however, is not in the position to force
the traditional structure to take action. Moreover,
even if it should succumb to community pressure, it
holds the option to fully execute the remedial action.
It also reserves this option because it controls the
resources that action requires. The informal power
structure cannot select the course or extent of inter-
vention unless the traditional power structure allows it
to do so. Neither can it participate in solving the
problem without first obtaining the approval of the
governing structure. The obvious example of this power
arrangement between the two structures is the case of
the BURP effort mentioned above. The community could not
automatically involve itself in the program. First, it
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had to pressure the formal power-structure to allow it to
participate. Even then, participation did not mean the
right to control the program (by either independently
administering operations or by directing the development
resources). The role of the community in the BURP program
was fully dependent upon the position given it by the
government.
The community has traditionally held the subordinate
position; and remains dependent on the governing structure
to solve its problems. The only recourse to changing this
position is to have the community solve its own problems.
To do this, it must acquire the legitimacy and resources
that problem solving demands. Within this context, if the
community wishes to implement its own programs designed
to improve the over-all structure of the ghetto, it must
first acquire those two things. There have been situations
where this has occured. The organizations in the case
studies, Tenant Development Corporation and Roxbury Action
Program, are the "results" of two inner-city community's
decision to solve their own problems (as opposed to
expending its energies and resources to attempting to
force the governing structure to solve ghetto problems
for them). As I plan to show in the following chapter,
the task of acquiring those things is indeed an arduous
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one. First the community must gain the legitimacy to
develop (or improve the community) from the traditional
power structure; secondly, it must acquire the resources
to do so. But only a little of each can be acquired
from the formal structure. In the following chapter, we
will examine those problems the community encounters
while attempting to gain the initial legitimacy and
resources from the ghetto and then developing more
resources as well as the community systems, from that
point.
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CHAPTER IV: INDIGENOUS INTERVENTION FOR GHETTO DEVELOPMENT
As noted, Alien Agents are basically conceived from
the "will" of the traditional power structure. This is be-
cause it holds the legitimacy and has the available
resources to simply execute remedial action in the
community whenever it chooses to do so. This is not
the case with the Indigenous Agent. The latter must
acquire legitimacy and (at least) the initial resources
from the governing structure in order to develop the
community. I submit that the community power structure
must successfully progress through a "conflict" stage
against the traditional structure that enables it to
conceive or create an Indigenous Agent. Furthermore,
the objectives of "conflict" and "ghetto development"
are wholly different from one another; and the transi-
tion from one stage to the next is the most critical
factor in determining how effective the Indigenous Agent
can become while attempting to improve the ghetto
environment. First, the "conflict stage" is examined
in more specific detail; then analysis is made of the
problems it causes when the Indigenous Agent must pro-
gress to "develop" the community it functions to serve.
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"The Conflict Stage"
It is during the donflict stage that an initial
stimulus for action occurs. A "proto" indigenous agent
or protest group emerges. This group serves as the
catalyst for moving the community through conflict
required to acquire resources. Ultimately, this group
becomes the development agent.
Initially, there must be defects in the ghetto
environment which cause residents to take action. Usually
those most affected by the conditions constitute the
initial group demanding the change. Although there may be
a number of undesirable conditions affecting residents,
it is only one which serves to stimulate action. For
example, residents who live in severely inadequate housing
may be confronted with a multitude of problems. However,
it is the severity of the housing problem that causes
residents to protest.
The identified problem is perceived by the residents
as one of such magnitude and dimensions that its solution
requires action that cannot be provided by the individual
resident (or for that matter, the group of residents
responding to the problem). For example, the problem
might be the "lack of jobs in the community" or "high
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crime rates", etc. Obviously, problems of this nature
are of proportions exceeding the capacity of the individual
resident.
The residents' action will manifest itself in the
form of protest. The members of the protest group will-
call upon the traditional power structure to remedy the
situation, simply because this is the conventional channel
in which community problems are solved.
The entire stage is similar to Saul Alinsky's
"community -conflict model". The first task of the protest
group must be to develop a strong neighborhood association.
The objective of the organization is to seize all vestiges
of community power for the purpose of combating the power
structure. This objective is reached through providing
sources of conflict. The group must heighten the aware-
ness of distinctions between community interest - and
opposing outside interests. The program is issues and
crises-oriented in that there is no formal planning of
either action or policies of the movement. Typical
tactics employed by the organization against the
traditional power structure (or members thereof)
include demonstrations, boycotts, establishing picket
lines and other forms of legal and extra-legal activities
protest action. The power that arises from community
cohesion stemming from the community's recognition of
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undesirable conditions provides the force required to
impel the traditional structure to relinquish its position.2
The protest group solicits the support of the community
through the informal power structure. In doing so, it
accomplishes two things. First, it mobilizes the forces
of the community; secondly, it begins to construct a
legitimate base allowing it -to be recognized as part of
the informal structure.
The usual intent behind taking this action is to
build a force that can pressure the traditional power
structure to address the problem. However, depending on
a host of variables (stemming from such matters as the
particular community involved, the issues at hand, former
protest against the traditional power structure, the
actual problem stimulating the protest and the protest
group itself), the primary emphasis may shift away from the
actual problem over which the protest was initiated. The
new direction demands that the traditional structure
relinquish its right to execute remedial action; and more
important, the protest groups'demand that it be given
the right to control the resources required for remedial
action.
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In a few instances, the traditional structure
recognizes the demand and relinquishes its position to the
protest group. In most cases, however, the structure
refuses to do this. Depending on the specific conditions,
the protest group may retract its demand or instead con-
tinue to pursue that direction. Should the latter take
place, the group attempts to prepare the community for
conflict.
It should be pointed out that the struggle is not an
all-encompassing one in the sense that the protest group
even advocates complete political control. Rather, the
objectives of the conflict focus on very narrow matters.
For example, if the problem stimulating the effort
concerned high crime rates, then the ensuing conflict
converges on gaining the control of resources for
executing remedial action in that particular area. Or
if the conflict concerns a poor educational facility,
then the objective is to acquire resources required to
provide alternative schools, etc.
The most well-known example of this process taking
place is the "Woodlawn Organization Two", based in
Chicago. This community group, led by Alinsky, held the
center of attention during the War Against Poverty years
for its militant position not only against poverty, but
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also against the program itself. Alinsky felt that the
means to build true community power was to point out the
problems in the anti-poverty program to the community and
utilize the adversion to the program as the basis for
building a strong community coalition.3 The objective
of the organization was to seize power in the community;
and utilize the collective power to battle the power
structure and demand change.4
For a short period of time, the "community conflict
model" received considerable support. Similar efforts
modeled after the Woodlawn Organization were established. 5
However, the concept of "protest for change" proved to be
only half of what was needed; the other part consisted of
protest groups successfully transforming into development
agents. Frank Riesman strongly criticized Alinsky's
theories on the grounds that the model attempted to build
power for power's sake. And what the community poor were
really interested in was what things power could potentially
bring.6 Clark and Hopkins also criticized the model and
point out:
"Conflict...does not necessarily mean that the
poor will succeed in bringing about the desired
changes. Even a direct confrontation of power
can be aborted and evaded and the energies of
the poor dissipated through resilience, shrewd-
ness, skillful parrying, intransigence, and the
marshalling of superior power on the part of
local political and government apparatus..." 7
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Norton E. Long, professor of politics at Brandeis
University, is also critical of another aspect of the
Alinsky conflict model:
"The Alinsky formula assumes some kind of
bootstrap magic by which individual neighborhoods
can solve their problems through an almost Mao-
like belief in the magic of efficacy of unaided
-human will. It seems doubtful in the extreme
whether local communities can make up for an
inadequate national growth rate and in many,
if not most cases, the local economy is a
reflection of factors beyond its individual
control. The Alinsky model may thus lead to
profound conservatism in practice in which
radical slogans and rent strikes serve as a
substitute for coordinated programmatic national
action. Neighborhood organization without
adequate theorem may produce no more than
piecemeal noble gestures..." 8
First, it is not until the point where the traditional
power structure capitulates, and relinquishes its
authority, that the protest group acquires the legitimacy
(and initial resources) to execute specific remedial
action on its own behalf. When the community has acquired
these things, only then is the Indigenous Agent conceived.
More often than not, the protest group becomes that
Indigenous Agent, in that the traditional power structure
turns over limited resources to the group; and recognizes
its right to formulate and administer its own program
action for the community.
'N
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Whether the new development agent can expand its
activities from one area to serve an agent capable of
implementing an over-all ghetto development program
presents another set of problems (as Long suggests).
Furthermore, its ability to accomplish these things will
depend on how well it can meet the arduous task of
transformation. By transformation I refer to its obvious
need to modify its organizational objectives from the
business of protest to that of development. As the
following discussion indicates, this is the most critical
and imnediate business at hand.
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"From Conflict to Development : The Critical Transition"
At the point where the protest -group acquires its
hard-earned position as Indigenous Agent, the organization
must then transform its objectives from that of "protest"
to that of "development". The organization must modify
two basic aspects of its character. First, it must
reorganize its administrative structure; and its relationship
to the community at large. Secondly, the agent must
establish economic linkages and political linkages with
outside forces, i.e., the traditional power structure.
Organizational Transformation
By "organizational transformation", I refer to the
important changes that must be made in the former protest
groups' internal administrative structure and its
relationship to the community. An organization involved
primarily in protest action will have a different design
from one concerned with ghetto development. The issues
are as follows:
A. Modifications in the Administrative Structure
Typically, before the transition, the organiza-
tion's structure is characterized by its informal and
disorganized manner. First, the membership is one that is
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suited best for protest activities. The protest group
solicits as many new members as possible. This is impor-
tant because its strength lies in the support it gains from
the over-all community. Also, mass "manpower" is required
for participation in strikes, boycotts, etc. The
intensity of the conflict will usually determine the size
of the group. Secondly, the decision-making process of
the group is highly informal. Decisions are made by group
consensus. Oftentimes, in fact, one or two "charismatic"
community leaders are responsible for holding the group
together and providing direction.
Effective development efforts require a new type
of organizational structure. First, the organization needs
to become more selective in soliciting members. The most
beneficial will be those who possess the skills that can aid
in the development process. For example, attorneys, business
managers, architects, etc., will be more beneficial to
development effort than merely amassing large numbers of
members with no particular skills. Even more important,
the group requires a highly formal decision-making process
that the former process of group consensus simply could
not provide. Specific persons need to be held accountable
for designing and executing the development program. Over-
all, a clearly defined decision-making process is essential;
one that can readily synthesize sophisticated and technical
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materials in order to make wise decisions on available
alternatives. In addition, the organization will require
a leadership beyond that which charismatic leadership
offers. The organization must develop a permanance and
independence that transcends that offered by individuals.
Changes in the hierarchal structure and inter-
relationships of the organization will be forthcoming.
Such change may cause additional problems. First, if the
organization formerly had few skilled or professional
members and new members are solicited, they may be taking
power positions held by the older members. This causes
conflict. The charismatic leadership might resent moves to
replace the talents he offers with an administrative
officer.
Should the organization fail to make the required
changes in membership, it will remain dependent upon out-
side technical support. This could potentially threaten
the independence of the organization and no doubt would
increase the operating costs due to the need to "import"
outside skills. Moreover, unless the organization acquires
the professional expertise, the progress of the develop-
ment effort may be slowed down.
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B. Modifications in Relationships Between the
Administrative Structure and the Community
This variable concerns changes that result from
the new position of the former protest group and the
larger community. Again, the success of the effort will in
part depend on how well the transition is made in this
area. The three primary areas of concern are: the
policy-making process; identification of the "community";
and the mechanism of communications between the agent and
the community.
During the protest stage the policies of the
group were pre-determined simply to meet the objectives
behind the protest. The protest group could afford to
define the ghetto community in loose and very abstract
terms, i.e., anyone who might live in the area and support
the purpose of the protest. Also, communication - that is,
the information between the protest group and the community
at large - was elementary. For example, the flow of
information was one-directional in that it emulated from
the protest group to the community residents. All that
was required was that those residents have some general
understanding of the issues of protest and that supporters
know when and where protest action would take place.
Page 105
Ghetto development requires a change of relation-
ships on all three counts. First, the development agent would
have to determine what group (really specific individuals)
would define the policies of the organization. Ideally,
the organization would find policy makers from a broad
spectrum of various groups, classes and perspectives (with
the added criteria that the selected policy makers had the
available time to involve themselves in activities and had
some ability to set good policies). Secondly, the agent needs
to establish a more defined concept of what particular
group or groups it represented. Who would be the most
direct beneficiaries of its labors; and who could it call
upon for support. The broadly perceived "community"
permissable (and desirable) for protest action would be
inadequate for development activities. Finally, the
communications between the group and the community require
modifications. The flow of information need be two-
dimensional in order to disburse information as well as
receive it. Moreover, the nature of information diffused
would change. Now more technical information would be
distributed in an attempt to keep the community informed of
plans and programs. For example, the agent would have a
more difficult time explaining the complicated provisions
of a housing development program to potential tenants than
it would urging an ill-housed group of tenants to strike
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against slum landlords. Or it would be more difficult to
find out what type of housing needs existed, as well as
what they desired, than to determine whether they were
distressed about high rents or inadequate building
maintenance.
The process itself held some dangers. The
development agent would need to learn to listen to policy-
makers representing the community as opposed to telling
the community what moves it should make against the
adversaries. Moreover, policy decisions would become more
difficult to come by simply because of the much broader
span of alternatives development might lead the agent into
any one of numerous directions. Further, communications
would be more difficult to maintain on all fronts.
Failure to progress through the required trans-
itions would result in a number of problems. First, by
failing to adequately provide a well-defined policy-
making mechanism, the agent would not have a clear direction.
-Continuous shifts in orientation would mean that the
agent would remain issue and conflict-oriented rather than
learning to execute a well-formulated and planned response
to the issues at hand. Finally, the failure to construct
an adequate communications network would cause the
community to become alienated from the development agent.
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This could lead to the community either actively or
passively withdrawing its support for the effort; thus,
defeating the central purpose of the initial conflict.
Economic and Political Resource Linkages
In part, the success of the agent's experiences in
"getting its house in order" will determine its ability to
maintain and expand its base of support outside of the
community. Because of the obvious lack of resources within
the community for investment and in development, particularly
at the outset, will primarily depend on the amount of
resources it can muster from such sources. The critical
difference being, of course, that now internal forces
control the resources of intervention. Economic and pol-
itical linkages refer to the ties the indigenous agent
establishes with the traditional power structure to carry
out activities and to expand the domain over which it
controls the resources of the ghetto development. The
primary considerations of each are outlined below:
A. Economic Resource Linkages
Beyond establishing legitimacy, the primary
objective of the "proto-development agent's" conflict is
to gain control of the resources of intervention, traditionally
controlled by the power structure. The success of the protest
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group climaxes when it gains control of such resources.
Typically, however, the resources are meager and only cover
the minimal costs required to perform some specific task
(over which the formal power structure has relinquished
its position to execute development activities). For
example, the resources might be expressly allocated to
the agent for the purpose of developing a manpower training
program or for establishing a community-based school. In
addition, resources are usually provided for only some
pre-determined time after which the agent must either
generate its own capital or solicit resources from another
outside source. Thus, the agent must develop a means of
becoming self-sufficient and expanding its base of operations.
Obviously, the long-range intent would be to generate
support resources within the community. The attainment of
that goal, however, is dependent upon its ability to
find the initial investment resources.
Another related point concerns the agent's ability
to locate technical and professional assistance required
for the development effort. During the protest stage, as
shown, the type of expertise required is of a different
nature than that which is essential for development.
The quality of expertise acquired will effect the success of
its endeavors. Naturally, the higher the quality of
resource skills acquired, the more equipped the agent will
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be to reorganize its structure as well as to execute its
development program. However, quality expertise could
potentially be the most costly expenditure item. Thus,
through economic linkages, the agent must locate quality
expertise at the lowest possible costs. For example, the
agent may solicit the support of colleges and universities
that can voluntarily supply technical and professional
skills. Again, long-range goals will be to develop such
supportive services from within the ghetto community, but
the agent must first get the programs initiated to reach
that goal.
B. Political Linkages
Following the conflict stage, the new development
agent finds itself in a peculiar position. Up to the point
where.it has successfully managed to control the resources,
the indigenous agent has actively engaged in conflict with
the traditional power structure. It has also sought to
alienate the ghetto community from outside forces with the
purpose in mind of gaining greater support for the conflict
against the traditional power structure. However, once it
has succeeded in forcing that structure (or member thereof)
to capitulate, then the agent must attempt to rebuild cooper-
ative relationships with its former adversaries. This is
primarily because of the need to maintain and expand economic
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linkages. The power structure, after all, holds the bulk
of resources that can potentially serve the purpose of
development (until that time when the agent can generate
its own).
The transformation process requires the agent to
re-establish its political -linkages with the outside forces.
Again, its success,in part, its ability to survive on its
own and determine the direction of intervention is dependent
on how well the political ties are maintained. In
addition, through accomplishing these ends, the agent
reinforces its legitimacy as a rightful development
organization. The extent to which it can reinforce its
legitimacy through such linkages will determine its ability
to extend its base of operations. The successful agent
must recognize the precarious circumstances surrounding its
emergence; and carefully proceed, with the alternatives
of seeking expansion through cooperation as opposed to
reverting to protest conflict states on which it was
founded.
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CHAPTER V: DEVELOPMENT TECHNIQUES: UNBALANCED AND BALANCED
GROWTH STRATEGIES
Previously it has been argued that Alien Agents,
despite the vast amount of resources at their disposal,
simply cannot forge the kinds of "system" changes in the
ghetto structure that development requires. Blaustien and
Faux point out, however, community development is poor
people pooling their resources together and attempting to
improve their lot.1  The central question becomes, given
the minimal resources available to the Indigenous Agent,
how can it substantially impact the over-all environment?
As I suggested earlier, the "need" for development
efforts implies that something in the ghetto community is
not developed or is under-developed. I have defined those
under-developed factors as the social, political and
economic systems of the structure. Given the severity of
their financial constraints, I suggest that Indigenous
Agents must follow either one of two principle routes
in obtaining over-all development - either an Unbalanced or
Balanced Growth Strategy.
By "Growth Strategy", I refer to the techniques of
development. Economist Albert Hirschman proposes that
there are two basic methods or means of development that
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under-developed countries can utilize. One route consists
of expanding (or maturing) one sector of the economy and
this in turn stimulates further growth in other sectors.
This is "Unbalanced Growth". By concentrating on the first
sector and using all available resources to impact positive
change here, these changes will in turn produce more change
in other sectors.3  In the second route, "Balanced Growth",
the country attempts to simultaneously develop all sectors
of the economy at once. The rationale is, of course, that
the various sectors are intricately interwoven and under-
development in one sector impedes growth in others. The
only way the cycle can be broken is to develop each sector
at an even pace.4
From my perspective on ghetto development, the
economic system is only one of three that must be improved
upon, thus differing in some respect from the economists'
conception of development. However, for lack of better
terms and an accepted theory, I take the liberty to
attempt to define ghetto development in the same context
as Hirschman's theory of unbalanced growth strategies and
balanced growth strategies.5 Therefore, through employing
an unbalanced growth strategy, the Indigenous Agent
organizes all energies and resources into one project or
activity. It uses this project not merely to impact change
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in one area, but rather also intends to effect change in all
three systems of the structure.
Unbalanced Growth
Here the underlying assumption is that one area or
activity that can stimulate or generate comprehensive change
exists. The agent must identify such. George Shipman,
professor of political sciences at the University of
Alabama, coments on the objectives of this approach:
"As usually the case with (such) efforts at
socio-economic change, the impact does not
appear to result directly from intervention.
Rather, the intervention action program produces
change inducing influences which in turn are
expected to generate the sought-for change.
It is the change-inducing influences that are
the outputs of the program system, the products
of productive activity... 6
Another assumption is that growth need not take
place at an equal pace through all of the realms. Rather,
some areas may be more advanced than others. In fact,
Hirschman suggests that it is when inbalances occur in the
economy that new opportunities exist for inducing addi-
tional growth.
Beyond the obvious requirement of initial investment
resources (which will be discussed later on), the primary
requirement is that the agent find some project that can
serve as a starting point for developing the various aspects
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of the economy. The project need not.stimulate growth
simultaneously. However, it must at least stimulate growth
in one of the three realms of the ghetto system. For
example, the project selected might be aimed towards
developing the economic system Profits derived from this
area can then be utilized for reinvestment in social
development. The social development may in turn,
stimulate greater social cohesiveness which will lead to
developing the political realm, etc.
The most feasible project is one that can stimulate
growth directly in a number of areas, which will increase
the inducing of influences that are the outputs of the
project activity. For example-, the project might stimulate
some growth in the economic sector while at the same time
stimulate growth in one of the other sectors, either the
political and/or social sector. The crucial point is,
however, that the project does not have to allow for each
of the sectors to develop at an equal pace.
Balanced Growth
This perspective holds that the above method is
totally unfeasible or is at least, a less effective manner
of producing over-all development. This is because the
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general state of under-development existing in the area,
the perspective holds, impedes the progression of any one
area beyond a limited scope. Thus, the agent cannot
develop the economic realm unless it also develops, equally,
the political and social realms. Within the context of
purely economic development analysis, the following
example would apply:
"a shoe factory - which gets underway by itself in
an under-developed country - is likely to turn
into a failure; the workers, employees and owners
of the shoe factory will obviously not buy all
of its output while the other citizens of the
country are caught in an under-development
equilibrium where they are just able jointly
to afford their own meager outputs. Therefore,
it is argued that to make development possible,
it is necessary to start, at one and the same
time, a large number of new industries which
will be each others' clients through their 8purchases or workers, employees and owners...
In the above case, the crucial inter-connections
between the various sectors of the economy forbid one
project from developing and generating development in
other sectors. Therefore, the best strategy is one that
allows for simultaneous development. Within the context
of ghetto development, as has been defined, the three
sectors or realms - political, social and economic - are
intricately inter-connected and progression of one demands
that equal progression be taken in other realms. Therefore,
the best strategy is one that allows for simultaneous
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development to take place. From this there exists a need
for the development agent to engage its resources and
energies in diverse projects and activities in order to
develop the three systems in a balanced manner.
The principal requirement for implementing the
balanced growth strategy (again, beyond initial resource
needs) is that the agent accurately select diverse
action which can, in fact, allow for development to occur
in the three realms at an equal pace. If the agent fails
to identify such project and employment resources and
energies there, then it jeopardizes the successfulness of
all of the projects and in obtaining the ultimate develop-
ment objectives.
The Indigenous Agent finds itself in a difficult
situation at the time it acquires its initial development
resources. As pointed out earlier, the newly-conceived
agent is only involved in one particular activity - that
which the initial problem stimulating the conception of
the agent concerned. Yet, in order to become an effective
development agent, it must acquire the capability of
impacting comprehensive improvement on the three realms
of the ghetto structure. To do this, the agent can decide
to continue to concentrate on the single activity and
utilize the unbalanced growth strategy, or, instead, the
agent can consciously expand its base of operations by
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seeking to engage in diverse activities, and thereby
employ, the balanced growth strategy. There are certain
hazards associated with employing the former strategy,
namely whether or not the initial activity (leading to the
emergence of the agent) is one that can stimulate unbalanced
growth - particularly in light of the unplanned and dis-
organized manner in which the agent became involved in the
area. On the other hand, there are other risks involved
in attempting to expand the base of operations and employ
a balanced growth strategy. These potential risks and
strengths are examined in the analysis of Indigenous Agent
presented in the final section.
Page 119
FOOTNOTES
A. Blaustien and G. Faux, The Star Spangled Hustle
(Garden City: Doubleday, Inc., 1972), P. 186.
2Albert Hirschman,' The' Strategy of Economic Develop-
ment (New Haven: Yale Press, 1958), pp. 50-73,
3 Ibid., pp. 50-73.
4Ibid, pp. -50-73.
5 (For additional information see: Hirschman,
Development Projects Observed ((Washington: Brookings
Institute, 1967)),pp. 24,/ 78, 84; also see: Methods
of Industrial Development (Paris: Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development, 1962), pp. 79-84,
92-112, 237-249),
6 George Shipman, Designing Program Action Against
Urban Poverty ( : University of Alabama
Press, 1971), p. 61.
7 Hirschman, Strategies of Economic Development, p. 73.
.8Ibid, p. 51.
Page 120
SECTION THREE
Introduction
The case studies on the Tenants' Development Corpora-
tion (TDC) and the Roxbury Action Program (RAP) are presented
in Chapters VI (6) and VII (7) respectively. The central
focus concerns the relative advantages and problems that
each organization has encountered during its transformation
from "protest" to development; and their ability to meet
comprehensive ghetto development objectives, particularly
in light of their choice to employ an unbalanced (TDC) or
balanced (RAP) growth strategy.
The Chapters are broken into three parts. The first
examines the community in which the organization is based,
its emergence as a development agent and the transformation
process from- protest to development; the second outlines the
intended plans for reaching comprehensive development
objectives; and the third is an evaluation of its program
structure and ability to meet those objectives.
Chapter VIII (8) is the conclusion on the case
studies. Based upon the above analysis, I present my
views on which of the opposing strategies, balanced or
unbalanced, is best suited for the arduous tasks that
confront the Indigenous Agent.
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CHAPTER VI: CASE STUDY - TENANTS' DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
PART I
Background Information:
A. The South End Community
Tenants' Development Corporation is based in the
South End of Boston (see Map 1). At the turn of the century
this community was one of the residential areas for
Boston's upper-middle income families. The elegant single
home rowhouses were among the best constructed in the East.
Since that time the South End declined rapidly, as
whites moved to the suburban ring and Blacks came into the
central city. With this influx, the fine homes were broken
into multi-family dwellings or converted into rooming
houses.
Currently, a dramatic change is taking place in
this community. It is now distinguishable by its
unusually extensive racial, ethnic and socio-economic
mixture. Ten to fifteen years ago, the area was predominantly
Black; and more recently, mainly single whites and Hispanic
populations have migrated into the community. Moreover, in
the last few years, young white professionals are moving
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into the area to reclaim the rowhouses.as single family
dwellings. Also, real estate developers, recognizing a
growing market, are purchasing and rehabilitating the row-
houses to create luxury apartments. At the same time, the
poor and minority populations are being pushed from the
South End as landlords charge exorbitant rents. The result
is that the community is one in transition. 2
B. The Emergence of Tenants' Development Corporation
The events taking place leading to what is now
TDC began in the spring of 1967. At that time the United
South End Settlements3 (U.S.E.S.) employed a Black community
organizer to work with poor tenants in the area and organize
them to strive for better housing in the community.
Under the leadership and direction of Ted Parrish,
the movement gained momentum, particularly among Blacks in
the area. Parrish helped the organization prepare itself and
the community for a major battle against the absentee slum
4
landlords. South End Tenants' Council (SETC) sought and
received the assistance of the Boston Legal Assistance
Program (BLAP) .5 Upon thoroughly investigating individual
cases, BLAP decided to litigate on behalf of the organiza-
tion's tenants against a number of landlords. However, the
legal machinery proved to move too slowly for the anticipations
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and frustrations of the tenants. SETC-decided the time had
come for more direct action. It called for a community-wide
rent strike against landlords who failed to keep their
housing in safe and sanitary conditions. In addition, the
organization began to concentrate the thrust of the protest
against one landlord, Joseph Mindick. Although Mindick
maintained considerable holdings throughout the South End,
he lived in a better section of Boston, in the predominantly
Jewish Mattapan. The fact that Mindick was of the Jewish
faith came to play an important factor in the course of
events.
During the spring of 1968, while the tenants and
landlords were locked in a stalemate of cross-litigation,
in an unprecedented move, the Massachusetts Rabbinical Court
of Justice6 offered to intervene into the matter and
arbitrate a final decision between the conflicting groups.
Mindick, a strong supporter of his faith, immediately
agreed; and SETC, recognizing the potential sanctions the
Court could place against any Jewish members found "guilty",
decided to allow the Court to arbitrate.
After ten official meetings and four weeks of
arbitration, the Court ordered Mindick to paint and
plaster apartments, repair plumbing, cover floors and put
new locks on all the doors. Further, the Court established
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a process that would allow both tenants and landlords to
bring their grievances and disputes to a final settlement.
Also, the Court ruled that if Mindick decided to sell his
properties, then SETC should have the first option to buy.7
The South End had also been designated as a
Boston Urban Renewal-project area. The Boston Redevelopment
Authority (BRA) was in the process of locating developers
to rehabilitate the worn rowhouse buildings that predominated
the community. Because of the resources the Authority had
available and its connections with the Housing and Urban
Development Department, SETC (with the assistance of BLAP
and the Rabbinical Court) entered into negotiations with the
BRA. On August 11, 1969, Hale Champion, Authority Director,
announced that an understanding had been reached between the
tenants' association and the city. The understanding -
that SETC, through a development corporation (later to be
named the Tenants' Development Corporation) would become
owner, redeveloper and manager of twenty buildings located
on scattered sites throughout the area.8 The Rabbinical
Court had ordered Mindick to sell his properties to the
BRA; and in turn, that agency would re-sell the properties
at "write-down" costs to the development corporation. In
addition, the BRA would assist TDC in applying for a
guaranteed rehabilitation loan through HUD 236 rent subsidy
program of the National Housing Act.
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The process had been completed; SETC had waged a
successful battle against the local government authorities
and the landlords. TDC was to be established as the
development arm of the organization.9
C. Program Objectives
The primary objective of TDC has been to purchase,
redevelop and manage low income housing for poor and minority
households in the South End.10 In doing so, however, the
organization has attempted to positively effect the over-all
community environment through its activities in this area.
In this manner, TDC serves as an Indigenous Agent, utilizing
the "unbalanced" growth strategy as a means of ghetto
development.
N
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Evaluation of Transformation Stage (In Light of Choice
of Growth Strategy):
A. Modifications in the Administrative Structure
Before the development stage, the organization
enlisted active support from a broad range of different
types of residents in the area. It solicited and received
the membership of poor and minority tenants. Also, many
persons from the middle class segments (such as homeowners
and university students) identified with the struggle and
gave SETC full support.
Presently, the number of persons actively involved
with the organization has dwindled to a mere handful. Mainly
this is the result of the limited role that membership holds.
The TDC general body is now a very loosely organized group
which only comes together once a year to select the corporate
board of directors. 1 1
Previously, the decision-making process was poorly
defined. For the most part, leadership was vested in one
person, Ted Parrish. Decisions were made informally by
group consensus. But now all of this has changed. The
corporate board of directors is the executive mechanism.
Where the organization had once been dependent on their
charismatic leader for direction, when Parrish left, the
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board filled the resulting power vacuum.12
As executors, the board of directors, in effect,
serves as the administrative structure. (See Chart 1.)
This arrangement exists for a number of reasons. First,
the organization did not possess the financial resources
required to employ its own full-time professional staff.
Secondly, TDC has been able to utilize the services of a
nonprofit housing consultant firm (which carries out much
of the day-to-day business).
The effectiveness of this administrative arrange-
ment has been minimal; primarily because it only functions
on a part-time basis. In that there is no full-time staff,
board members meet bi-monthly to decide the course of the
day-to-day operational matters. These stringent time
constraints force the board to spend the majority of its
time dealing with crisis situations; thus, it has not had
the time to address the broader development issues in a
sufficient manner. Some members feel that the present
arrangement makes the corporation overly dependent on out-
side professional and technical assistance.13
I believe its utilization of the unbalanced
growth strategy has hindered the organization's ability to
develop an effective and responsive administrative mechanism.
Because of their decision to concentrate on one activity,
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board members have felt that, with minimal assistance, they
could handle the business at hand (on a part-time basis).
The importance of developing a full-time professional staff
has been played down; and placed far down on the priority
list. Had TDC been involved in more diverse areas from
the outset, the board may have more readily foreseen
the problems that would arise as a result of failing to
establish a strong administrative structure.
B. Modifications in Relationship to the Community
The board also serves as the policy-making
mechanism (which ties TDC to the greater community). Member-
ship includes tenants, professional housing developers and
community leaders. Over-all, the mechanism is much more
carefully structured than it was during the conflict stage.
TDC has identified one particular segment of the
community as the group the organization represents and
functions to serve. These are the poor and minority
families of the South End, particularly those ill-housed;
these residents are the primary concern of the organization.
However, TDC has had a more difficult time in attempting
to designate any specific location in the community as the
"target area". This is because the transition taking
place in the South End has fragmented neighborhoods. Some
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consist exclusively of either middle-class or poor residents,
whereas many are comprised of market racial and socio-
economic mixtures. As a result of this factor, TDC per-
ceives the "ghetto community" as a scattered and transient
one.
Formalized communications between TDC and the
community are non-existent. The organization has not made
an assertive effort to keep area residents informed on
development activities or future plans.1 4 In addition, it
failed to ascertain community needs and desires from the
perspective of the poor and minority populations. The lack
of adequate communications between TDC and residents has
hindered the agent's effectiveness in meeting development
objectives. At this point, it is fair to point out that
TDC has no concrete perspective on how well its programs are
operating to meet their anticipated ends because the
failure to construct a two-dimensional information network.15
C. Resource Linkages
TDC has established two very important economic
resource linkages: The Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA)
and the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).
Although many others have assisted, these two organizations
have made the bulk of development resources available. In
addition, TDC has also made an important technical linkage.
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The Greater Boston Community Development Corporation, Inc.
(GBCD), a nonprofit housing consultant firm, provides (at
greatly reduced costs) essential services to the organiza-
tion. 16
Because the corporation has maintained good
relationships with outside organizations (such as the BRA
and HUD), it has reinforced its own position as a developer
and could potentially expand its base of operations.
Moreover, as a result of these political ties, it has
gained even greater assistance.1 7
Although the organization's resource linkages are
strong, they are not diversified. Because TDC has been
involved, exclusively with housing activites (as opposed to
multiple projects), it has developed substantial linkages
for such operations. At the same time, TDC has not sought
to expand the types of outside resources. Because of the
limited scope, the corporation has become too dependent on
too few outside resources. (See Chart 2.) Should the
anticipated in-flow of funds be abruptly terminated, the
organization would collapse as a result of its inability
to function on its own.1 8
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PART II
Ghetto Development Objectives
Although not precisely stated in the terms used below,
the following comments speak to the intended goals of the
development agent to accomplish over-all social, economic
and political development.
Social Objectives:
1. To provide the community with greater social
stability by rehabilitating new homes for
those groups who would otherwise be forced
to move out of the area;
2. To neutralize social conflict between various
racial, ethnic and socio-economic classes
that detract from social cohesion;
3. To create a more stable home environment for
poor and minority families and thereby reduce
the symptomatic social problems of crime
and other social deviant behavior.
In accomplishing these ends, the organization will
have forged structural changes in the modifications in the
over-all social environment of the South End community.
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Economic Objectives:
1. To increase the collective wealth of poor and
minority residents through the acquisition and
redevelopment of significant amounts of
residential holdings;
2. To stimulate new demands on the business
sector of the ghetto economic system by
utilizing the goods and services of that
sector for all phases of housing development
activities;
3. To increase employment opportunities for
ghetto residents,
Through the above activities, resources will circulate
more fluently through the community before filtering back
into the greater economic structure. In effect, the economic
system of the ghetto will have been substantially expanded
and improved.
Political Objectives:
1. To enhance the political position of the
South End's poor and minority populations,
indirectly, through improving the social
and economic conditions of the area.
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Although housing development activities will not
generate direct political improvements, the progressive
cumulation of economic and social wealth will then in turn
generate political position of these groups.
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PART III
An Evaluation of Program Effectiveness:
A. Social Development
The TDC effort thus far has failed to generate
substantial improvement in the social structure of the
South End. In part, the reason stems from a lack of
adequate resources to impact change on a massive scale.
There are other reasons behind this failure, however, not
related directly to financial matters. The most important
fault is that the agent failed to make certain that the
intended social aims stimulated as a result of housing
development were in fact taking place.
In a number of situations, TDC found itself
working against its own social development goals. A typical
example of this problem occured during the construction
phase of the first rehabilitation project. Here, TDC failed
to maintain close contact with tenants who been temporarily
relocated from their homes so that the construction work
could be carried out. Rather than exploiting their rightful
opportunities to return to their homes and neighborhoods once
the rehabilitation was completed, many tenants as a result
of confusion and misunderstanding caused by poor
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communications simply left the South End in search of new
homes. Thus, in this instance, TDC contributed to the same
type of social instability it was attempting to combat.
In another case, the TDC housing effort stimulated
social discord in the South End, as opposed to eliminating
some of the social conflicts between various racial and
socio-economic groups. While planning the second project,
South End Tenants' Houses II, TDC had failed to gain
adequate insight into the needs and desires of neighborhood
tenants. When it announced plans to rehabilitate a large
structure for occupancy by large families, many residents
in the particular area protested the plans on the grounds
that there were already too many children in the neighbor-
hood. Then an opposing group of residents complained that
the former group represented the interests of white middle-
class; and were simply attempting to keep large minority
families out. Before long, the neighborhood was torn into
two opposing camps; each accused the other of racial bias
and displaced class interest. The pure negligence of TDC
to discover beforehand what residents desired caused
considerable discord between different socio-economic and
racial groups.
For the most part, the business of housing
development and management has been too demanding for the
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agent. As a result of this factor, it did not take time
to examine how the effort was affecting social conditions
and determine whether its housing development program was
accomplishing social goals. In this sense, TDC could not
improve social conditions, not so much because its program
design was inaccurate, but rather because it failed to
provide for adequate follow-up.
B. Economic Development
The organization has been confronted with a
series of critical problems while attempting to utilize
its housing effort as a means of generating economic
development. The problem stems primarily from the fact
that housing development is in itself a business enterprise
and therefore certain conflicts arise between the goals of
developing successful housing projects and those of expanding
the community's business sector. The very survival of TDC
is dependent upon the success it experiences in housing
development. Necessarily, the agent has had to operate
under budgetary and fiscal constraints similar to those in
any business in order to remain financially sound.
First, TDC assumed that by creating a demand for
goods and services produced by minority enterprise it could
stimulate business expansion. The business sector would
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simply have to increase its productivity to meet the
increased demand. The problem has been that the demand
for goods and services has been so great that the community
sector has not been able to meet it. Therefore, TDC has
been forced to turn to outside businesses to handle its
larger demands. For example, the first project called for
rehabilitation of twenty rowhouse buildings (consisting of
100 units). TDC could not locate a minority general
contractor that was large enough to handle the job.19 The
same problems occured when it attempted to locate minority
sub-contractors. Most were simply too small to adequately
service 100 units; thus again, the agent was forced to
turn to outside enterprise. This problem has not been
solved. In the second project, the agent has also turned
to a large company to serve as the general contractor.
In fact, the effort involved so much capital that TDC could
not locate a minority bank in the area possessing enough
to finance the government-insured project loan.2 0
In most cases, demand has simply been too great
for the supplies local minority enterprise could even hope
to produce. In situations where they could, another set of
problems cropped up. Because of their smaller size, many
ghetto businesses could not offer their goods and services
at prices below (or even equal to) those of white companies.
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On a number of occasions, TDC has been forced to choose
between providing fiscal benefits for its housing interests
and assisting the Black business sector. For example, TDC
decided to employ the services of a minority fuel company
over a number of larger white companies who could have
supplied oil to the housing project at substantially lower
costs to the agent.
On the other hand, the TDC effort is contributing
to some long-range improvements in the economic structure.
First, properties of significant value are being acquired
and redeveloped in the interest of the poor. These holdings
can serve as leverage for attracting additional investment
resources in the South End. Secondly, South End Tenants'
Houses II (nearing initial closing) is a limited dividend
venture and will generate capital for TDC that can also be
channeled into future investments.
Currently, TDC housing efforts are not impairing
the community's economic structure. The problem is that for
all the energies being placed into the effort, it is not
generating expansion for the community at maximum potentials.
As a result of creating too great a demand on the community
business sector, TDC finds itself supporting big business
more extensively than the former sector.
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C. Political Development
TDC has not generated political development
through the housing effort (nor has it attempted to do so).
The organization is a nonprofit tax-exempt corporation.
Direct involvement in political activities would, of
course, jeopardize the housing development projects and in
turn the survival of the agent.
Because the organization has chosen to concentrate
its resources on housing alone, it has simply had to hold
off on improving the political situation until the point
where returns in the economic and social realms are great
enough to generate political improvements for the South
End's poor and minority populations. Thus, the agent,
through utilization of the unbalanced growth strategy,
is currently failing to impact political conditions.
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FOOTNOTES
1 Patrick Clancy, "The Need For Low Income Housing
in the South End", (Report Prepared for HUD Site Selection
Criteria on South End Tenants' Houses I, April, 1970),
p. 1. (TDC Corporate Records).
2 Langley Keyes, Jr., The Rehabilitation Planning
Game (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1969), pp. 35-52.
3 U.S.E.S., United South End Settlementsl this
nonprofit social welfare agency was established to assist
the needy in the South End. (For additional information
see: Keyes, The Rehabilitation Planning Game, pp. 50-52,
also see: Charles Fraggos, "A Settlements' Role in Community
Development", a paper presented at the Conference on Social
Welfare, May 26, 1965, Atlantic City).
4 SETC, South End Tenants' Council, established in
1968, this organization served as the initial protest
group. Currently, SETC functions to provide social ser-
vices to the area's tenants.
5 BLAP, Boston Legal Assistance Program, arm of
Office of Economic Opportunity functioning to provide free
legal services to the poor.
6 Ruth Gelmis, "The Bitter Blacks and Five Rabbis",
Look Magazine, April 1, 1969, pp. 43-44. The Rabbinical
Court function as arbiters of disputes and as interpreters
of Jewish law. There are about 12 such Courts in the
United States.
7 Arline Crimes, "Tenants, Mindick in Family
Pack", Boston Herald Traveler, Tuesday, August 6, 1969,
p. 40.
8
"Memorandum of Understanding", (unpublished);
this agreement was made between the BRA and TDC. (For
additional information see: "South End Tenants Given More
Independence", The Boston Globe, June 4, 1969, p. 1. Also
see: "Tenants on Their Own", The Boston Globe, July 26,
1970, p. A-52.
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9The relationship between SETC and TDC has never
been clearly defined. Legally, TDC has been established
as a separate corporation by the State of Massachusetts
and operates as such.
10
"TDC Incorporation Document", (1968), p. 1.
(TDC Corporate Records).
llThe By-Laws stipulate that the board will meet
annually to select the directors. It is only rarely when
TDC's general body meets. For example, the body has not
assembled during the last year.
12 Interview with Patrick Clancy, March 13, 1973.
Mr. Clancy is a consultant to TDC Development Committee.
1 3Members interviewed expressed this concern; that
the corporation needed to develop its own resource
mechanisms.
14The only exception to this fact is communications
between TDC and TDC's tenants.
15The organization has not attempted to correspond
with the greater South End population through newsletters,
public communications, meetings, etc., since the protest
period-.
16Greater Boston Community Development, Inc. (GBCD)
is a nonprofit development firm. The organization (formerly
South End Community Development), has been involved with
TDC development since the beginning. GBCD can offer less
expensive services to nonprofit community-sponsored housing
ventures.
17For example, after TDC received tentative designa-
tion as developer of the first package by the BRA, the
corporation received support it needed to develop the
rehabilitation plans (at no initial costs).
18Presently, TDC generates no resources capable of
sustaining operations. The limited dividend South End
Houses II will provide such funds in the future. Until that
time, the corporation is wholly dependent on outside funds.
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19
TDC was able to employ the services of a joint
venture between a well-established -white contractor and a
much smaller minority company. Most funds for the venture
went to services provided by the former firm.
20
The corporation attempted to locate a bank in
the New England area (excluding New York), but was unable
to locate one in the state or the immediate surrounding
areas.
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CHAPTER VII: CASE STUDY - ROXBURY ACTION PROGRAM
PART I
Background Information:
A. The Highland Park Community
Roxbury Action Program (RAP) is based in the
Highland Park area. This physically -attractive area (one of
the few "green belts" left in the city), is tucked away in
a hilly section of Boston's "Black" Roxbury.
The community is primarily residential. The
racial make-up is predominantly Black (approximately 80%);
and residents have mostly low (and some)moderate incomes.
The housing conditions are exceptionally blighted. It is
referred to by some as a "soft housing market" because
of the relatively low value of the stock. Many buildings,
though solid, are abandoned and damaged extensively by
vandals. In part, the community has been stagnant,
experiencing little economic activity or residential
development.
Although there had been efforts by residents to
revitalize Highland Park (prior to RAP's entrance), these
efforts were to little avail. The greatest fear in the
r2
WA ~ N
PROJECT AREAS
WITN hIN
BOSTON'S
_N_DEYELOPMENT
PROGRAM
SOSTON atIoV~tOPMENT AUTHORITY
- viii -
PpIt
148
Pa e 149
a.
olo
-- *I K *-B #7 i7-
t - -
t -
-- - . w . -- T
Page 150
community had not been that the area would not experience
revitalization, but rather the concern is that once
development begins, the processes would be out of their
hands.1
B. Emergence of the Roxbury Action Program
The present RAP operations emerged from a rather
unique set of circumstances beginning in 1964. At that time
the American Friends Service Commiteee (AFSC)2 decided to
sponsor a program in the Black community that would function
to assist residents with housing problems. That agency was
named the Roxbury Action Program.
The RAP office was housed on Blue Hill Avenue
(a main artery in the heart of Roxbury). The agency
equated its activities to that of the civil rights organiza-
tions operating on Blue Hill Avenue at the time. The
Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), Congress
on Racial Equality (CORE) and others were all based on the
"storefront strip". This was the height of the civil rights
movement; things were starting to happen in Boston.3
For a two year period, the RAP staff, headed by
George Morrison, functioned to improve landlord/tenant
relations. During this time, staff members, through their
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experiences, came to the realization that their approach
was not a viable method for solving the problems of the
community. Moreover, they concluded that AFSC (a white
sponsored organization) could not direct programs designed
to ameliorate the conditions of the minority community.
Thus, in 1967, the RAP staff approached the parent organiza-
tion and demanded that a new relationship be formulated.
RAP, under the exclusive direction of a Black community
staff, should move to solve the problems in the community
on its own.4
After over a year of negotiations with AFSC, the
agency agreed to grant RAP its "independence" and provide
resources that would enable it to carry out "ghetto develop-
ment" efforts. In June of 1969, the new RAP proposed a
development program that identified the Highland
Park area of Roxbury as the most feasible location for a
5
model Black community. In effect, an outside agent
agreed to legitimize an indigenous group and provide it
resources for development purposes.
C. Program Objectives
The new RAP, under the leadership of Mr. Morrison,
relocated its base of operations into Highland Park. The
objective was to develop and execute a plan of action that
could provide for social, economic and political development
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of the small community. To these ends, the organization
announced a comprehensive area master plan.6
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Evaluation of Transformation Stage (In Light of
Choice of Growth Strategy):
A. Modifications in the Administrative Structure
Before the development stage, RAP solicited support
from the over-all community; the primary issue at hand - poor
housing. The organization served as a mediator between
tenants and landlords, striving to pressure the latter
group to repair its stock and rent safe and decent housing.
Today, RAP continues to seek the active support of the
community; and, more important, it provides opportunities
for residents to become directly involved in the program.
RAP already possessed an organized administrative
structure. The transformation involved making it more
suitable for the new business at hand. Towards these ends,
the organization solicited persons with development skills
to serve on its staff. Because of financial constraints,
however, staff members initially handled two or more areas
of development.
The administrative structure's decision-making
mechanism has not changed dramatically. Mr. Morrison,
who has led the agent towards self-dependency, continues
to steer the direction of activities.7
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On the whole, RAP has developed an efficient and
effective administration. No doubt, part of its success
stems from the fact that it already possessed one that facilitate
the primary task of re-orienting its direction from "civil
rights" type work to community development. The selection
of a balanced growth strategy did not make this task easier.
However, because the programs were diversified, and in that
many required community participation, RAP was careful to
re-design the structure in a manner still conducive to
community participation. In this sense, the balanced
strategy helped in creating an effective mechanism.
B. Modifications in Relationship to the Community
From the on-start, the organization has been
faced with a delicate situation in deciding who should set
policies for the effort. On one hand, it represented all of
Roxbury. On the other, the project target area was Highland
Park. RAP did not "emerge" from Highland Park in the usual
sense of the word; rather it "embraced" the area. In order
to make the "marriage" more real to life, the agent not only
shifted its office to the area, but also requested staff
members to reside in Highland Park. Thus, the first to
be involved were the most recent indigents of the area.
Secondly, in order to place itself under the guidance of the
over-all Black community in general, and Highland Park in
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particular, RAP selected its Policy Committee from both
areas, though most members of the committee lived in Highland
Park.
Beyond drawing the geographic boundaries of the
community, the agent has been hesitant to identify any
specific segment of residents as the one it represents and
functions to serve, To this end, programs have been established
that will involve various segments, individually, as well
as the community as a collective.8
RAP also faced the problem of developing a commu-
nications network. At the point when it moved to the area,
direct inter-communications were naturally at the "zero"
-level. It embarked on a hard-publicizing campaign to
inform residents of its presence and plans.
The organization has been successful in developing
a strong responsive relationship with the greater community.
Many residents identify and participate in the various
activities and programs. The selection of a diversified
program approach has assisted the agent in building the
required strong connections with the residents, particularly
in that it directly involves citizens at the decision and
policy-making level.
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C. Resource Linkages
The major economic resources for RAP has been the
American Friends Service Committee (AFSC). Without these
9funds, RAP could not have become a reality. Beyond this
major source, the organization has moved in diverse directions
seeking financial assistance. It has developed a number of
housing projects. The sources for the efforts have included
HUD, MHFA and private investors. Moreover, RAP has turned
to another group of agencies for assistance in the various
projects. Basically, the resource policy has been to
emphasize development in those areas where outside investment
funds can be found. 1 0
RAP has also developed excellent technical and
professional resource linkages. Working especially with
various universities and colleges in the area, the organiza-
tion has attempted to tap all available professional and
technical assistance. Some of the resources include
Harvard University, M.I.T., as well as assistance from a
number of well-known law and architectural firms.1 1
RAP's economic resources are its political resources.
The organization has embarked on a carefully guarded and
well-planned course to reinforce its position as a
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community developer; and expand its base of operations.
Its relationship with AFSC and universities, such as
Harvard and M.I.T. has helped to strengthen its political
position and, through association, lessened its own "risk
factor" that potential investors normally take into account
before deciding to invest in the central city regions.
RAP has profited from employing the balanced
growth strategy in attempting to build resource linkages
with outside sources. Because it intends to execute
diverse programs, the number of potential sources has been
expanded. Rather than depending on only the AFSC, it has
attempted to off-set the potential weaknesses in that
arrangement by finding other resources that balance out its
dependency. Moreover, the agent has also moved to generate
income inside of the community that can serve as the founda-
tion for more self-reliant effort.
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PART II
Ghetto Development Objectives:
RAP has initiated a series of projects designed to
improve the over-all Highland Park environment. RAP's
objectives are outlined as follows:
1. To organize .the Black citizens of the Highland
Park area politically, economically and
culturally to develop a wide base of cooperative
and individual housing ownership;
2. To promote and support the economic self-
development of groups and individuals in the
community in cooperative efforts;
3. To provide through education and training, the
opportunity for participation in community
development by those who have the most to gain
in salvaging the neighborhood - the residents.1 1
* 12
Current programs to meet the above goals are as
follows:
Housing Redevelopment
Including the acquisition and rehabilitation of
neighborhood properties. The organization has rehabilitated
and now manages 60 units of low and moderate income housing.
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This has been accomplished through three projects (RAP-UP I,
II, and III). The next project (in planning stages) will
include new as well as rehabilitation work.
Business Development
RAP has initiated an exterminating company that
now services greater Black community. In addition, plans
are rapidly nearing completion on the establishment of a
drug store in the area.
Transportation Planning
The organization has also been involved with the
Boston Transportation Planning Review concerning the South-
west Corridor. The main interest in this has resulted
from potential impact new transportation projects would have
on the Highland Park area.
Community Organization
RAP has initiated a community organization program
that consists of a systematic effort to make a house-to-
house visit with residents. The process is an on-going one
in that organizers have developed a dialogue between
RAP and the community. This process has to be utilized to
gain a more in-depth understanding of problems the area
is encountering, as well as to gauge the effectiveness of
RAP's efforts to impact improvements.
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Other Activities
Until recently RAP has provided a draft
counseling service and is now in the process of developing
a community library. In addition to this, the organization
has established a center for the community, the Marcus
Garvey House.
Through executing the above programs, RAP has
attempted to launch a direct attack on the social, political
and economic defects in the Highland Park environment.
The resources of development have been organized to give
immediate attention to each of those three realms.
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PART III
An Evaluation of Program Effectiveness:
A. Social Development
The RAP effort has been successful in impacting
noticable improvement in social conditions of the area.
First, through continuous communications (on a person-to-
person basis) with residents, RAP has been able to instill
in many citizens a new sense of hope and pride in their
community. Further, the agent has cre'ated a new climate
where residents believe that the community is in control
of the development effort; and that RAP functions of their
behalf, as well as under their guidance. 1 3
Naturally, not all has been perfect. The agent
has also generated considerable conflict between Blacks
and whites in the area. For example, at one point white
residents in the so-called "Fort Hill" area of Highland
Park protected their neighborhood from outside "intruders",
i.e., RAP, with armed guards (primarily to protest what
they considered to be interference into their affairs).
Not until very recently has social and racial strife begun
to subside in the community. Secondly, RAP has, on occasion,
raised resident's anticipations that marked improvements would
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take place to a point beyond that which they could realis-
tically satisfy. In doing so, the agent has alienated some
residents from its program. On an over-all basis, however,
these shortcomings are far out-weighed by substantial social
improvement the agent's effort is providing.
B. Economic Development
RAP's economic development projects have not
substantially impacted economic conditions in Highland Park
(although they have provided limited new opportunities).
First, the housing programs together involved the rehab-
ilitation of only sixty units. Though helpful, these
efforts obviously have not remedied poor conditions in the
area's market; nor has community ownership of the properties
provided immediate and direct economic gains to residents.
On the other hand, the three projects have been small
enough to be readily handled by the minority business
sector and thereby creating reasonable new demands.
Also, the agent has successfully established a
management component currently servicing the units. In
this sense, the housing programs have assisted the economic
system of the community. Moreover, because the projects
are limited dividend, RAP is accumulating at least some of
its own investment resources.
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The business development program has only initiated
two enterprises - the exterminating company and the community-
inspired drug store. RAP has not accumulated adequate capital
requirements to launch a massive expansion of the area's
almost non-existent minority business sector. At present
it is difficult to see where the agent will ever generate
enough capital to do so. Furthermore, the feasibility of
its policy to impact structural improvements through
sponsoring minute businesses is questionable.
RAP has provided new employment and training
opportunities for community residents. Whenever possible,
RAP has attempted to employ indigenous populations in its
program. Also, the small businesses do provide jobs. In
addition to sponsoring academic scholarships to deserving
students, the agent actively encourages staff members and
related employees to expand their skills through further
training.
Although inadequate resources have tended to
constrain major economic achievement, the RAP model is
effective. Slowly, the agent is stimulating economic
expansion, accumulating investment capital and seeking
means of becoming fiscally solvent.
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C. Political Development
RAP has been able to muster some positive impact
on political conditions in Highland Park. Because of its
nonprofit tax-exempt status, the agent has not been able
to initiate or support overt political activities. It has
been able to move around that obstacle. Mainly, the agent
speaks of "cultural development". Particularly in a
predominantly Black community, cultural matters have strong
political undertones. For example, RAP's "Marcus Garvey
Community Center" symbolizes cultural achievement as well
as suggests a particular political perspective; and the
Black Nationalist flag waving over the agent's business
office is certainly a sign of political involvement.
The primary improvement in this area has been
RAP's success in increasing the political clout of the
community when negotiating with other communities or
the city government, etc. For example, it is highly im-
probable that any outside individual or group could initiate
development activities in the area without receiving prior
approval by RAP. While the major thrust of development has
been to improve the community's competitive power on an
internal basis, there is still much work to be done to
improve the political organization of residents.
Page 167
FOOTNOTES
Interview with Mr. Robert Perry, May 2, 1973. Mr.
Perry is Program Manager of RAP Housing Component.
2 American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) is a
nonprofit organization sponsored primarily by resources
of the white private sector. The committee functions to
assist various groups and government agencies.
3 Interview with Mr. Lloyd King, May 2, 1973. Mr.
King is Associate Director of RAP.
4Perry Interview, May 2, 1973.
5
"A Case History - Roxbury Action Program, Inc.",
(Research Paper prepared by Lincoln University, hereafter
referred to as "Lincoln Study", Summer, 1971), p. 3.
(RAP Corporate Records).
6
"RAP One Year Later", (Report prepared by George
Morrison on progress of RAP, September, 1971), pp. 1-3.
(RAP Corporate Records).
7 King Interview, May 2, 1973.
8King Interview, May 2, 1973.
9
Lincoln Study, p. 4.
10King Interview, May 2, 1973.
11
"Capability Statement", (A Report prepared by
RAP staff concerning resources, January, 1972), pp. 10-12.
(RAP Corporate Records). (For more information see:
Morey and Epstein, Housing Develooment ((Cambridge: Center
For Community Economic Development, 1971)), pp. 25-41).
12Ibid., pp. 3-6.
1 3 For example, the decision to open a community drug
store came primarily as a result of a community meeting
where residents identified this as a need above other businesses.
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CHAPTER VIII: CONCLUSION ON CASE STUDIES
Before responding to the question of which growth
strategy, unbalanced or balanced, has proven to be a more
effective tool for the agents analyzed in the case studies,
it is first important to comment on some factors not
directly related to growth strategies, but have potentially
effected the ability of the agent to meet comprehensive
objectives. The two primary factors concern the differ-
ences in the South End and Highland Park communities; and
in the origins of the development corporations.
First, the South End area is much larger in size
(see Map #3) , both geographically and in population; and
therefore, a relatively greater amount of resources and
energies are required to meet development objectives. Also,
the racial and socio-economic mixture of that community
has made the task of ghetto development more difficult
- than in Highland Park (if for no more reason than the
greater complexities involved in defining the "community"
and in selecting a specific "target area"). For TDC, the
problem has been further exasperated by the continuous
movement of populations to and from the area.
Secondly, although TDC and RAP emerged from a
similar situation, the specific circumstances behind their
emergence has been different. Mainly, TDC experienced a
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much more intensive conflict stage. The organization was
forced to involve itself in protest action in order to
persuade outside forces to relinquish their roles to the
tenant group. TDC followed a more precarious route to
becoming a development agent. Many significant events
directly affecting the course of things happened by
chance; and there was less time to plan or organize the
development program. On the other hand,, RAP, also
emerged from conflict, did so from more moderate and less
uncertain circumstances. In addition, the agent had
greater opportunities to carefully plan and design its
program.
As a result of these factors, I submit that TDC was
confronted with a more formidable task while attempting to
obtain development objectives in the South End community.
However, even taking these matters into consideration, I
contend that the choice of growth strategies has had a
significant impact on the agent's relative effectiveness
on impacting comprehensive improvements in their respective
communities. Furthermore, I have concluded that the
balanced growth strategy proved to be the better choice.
Before discussing the basis of this finding, I should first
examine why I believe that TDC's decision to employ an
unbalanced strategy served as a disadvantage.
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TDC made too many invalid assumptilns when employing
the unbalanced approach. In the first place, the notion
that the ghetto economic system could be readily expanded
through creating a huge new demand simply failed to hold up
under trial. Secondly, the belief that housing development
(in itself -a business enterprise) could be utilized to
single-handedly improve the greater ghetto business sector
without monetary trade-offs was also wrong in that there
were basic conflicts between "TDC" and "community" interests.
Moreover, the agent learned through a trying experience
that even when positive changes could be indirectly
generated through stimulating changes in one particular
realm, it is essential that the agent make certain that the
planned improvement does in fact take place. In addition
to all of these things, the unbalanced strategy made too
few demands on the agent to force it to construct an
efficient development program delivery system. With
these remarks, it is appropriate to examine how the
balanced strategy has been more effective.
RAP gained some important advantages in employing the
balanced strategy. Above all else, diversified program
action significantly increased the agent's ability to
involve a broader level of residents (with varied interests)
in the development activity. Furthermore, project diversi-
fication also enlarged the number of potential resource
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linkages; and thus, afforded RAP with more advantages to
develop a self-reliant base of operations. Principally,
for these reasons I submit that the balanced strategy
has been better suited to the needs of the Indigenous Agent.
Before closing, however, the question arises, is it
necessary that the Indigenous Agent develop the three
systems (social, economic and political) simultaneously
and at an equal pace, in order to enable it to bring about
comprehensive development? I would respond - yes and no.
Looking back, it seems ludicrous- to even suggest that
TDC has accomplished nothing. Particularly in light of the
fact that the organization controls millions of dollars
in real estate (and in the immediate future will acquire
millions of dollars more); or in realizing that the agent
is currently in the process of accumulating substantial
amounts of (self-generated) investment capital. And not to
mention, of course, that as a result of its action, the
living conditions of at least three hundred households in
the South End have been dramatically improved, simply by the
availability of low-cost decent homes TDC has developed.
Thus, plainly, the organization has made some improvements
through employing the unbalanced strategy.
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Alternatively, the Roxbury Action Program, despite its
successes, has not, to this point, fully "developed" the
systems of the Highland Park community. Economic and physical
blight remain much the same. Social and political improve-
ments are noticeable, but by no means all-encompassing.
The critical advantage the organization holds is that as a
result of its decision to involve itself in diverse projects
designed to address all three realms simultaneously, it has
tremendously expanded the limits of what it can accomplish.
For example, the efforts towards improving the social aspects
of the environment has contributed to its success in
involving community residents in program activities; in turn,
increased community involvement has helped the agent
develop its political clout; in turn, its strengthened
political position has expanded opportunities for further
economic investments that stimulate more growth, etc. ...
This process continues, with advancements in one realm helping
the agent forge development in other realms - thereby
providing unlimited potentials for ultimately reaching
maximum growth. I submit that it.is in this sense that
the balanced growth strategy offers more advantages
to the Indigenous Agent.
Based upon the development organizations analyzed in
the case studies, I contend that although the unbalanced
strategy does not obstruct the ability of an Indigenous Agent
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to create some improvements in the over-all ghetto structure
on a comparative basic, this method does in fact impede the
agent's success in building an efficient program delivery
system; and in bringing about comprehensive change in all
three systems. Moreover, I conclude that the balanced
growth strategy is best suited for community-based
development efforts as those investigated above. Although
through selecting this strategy the agent will not necessarily
experience success in either building an efficient program
execution process and/or provide for over-all development,
the strategy does increase the agent's'potential of
obtaining success. Through a well-planned and skillfully
executed development program, the Indigenous Agent,
applying this model, can more readily impact all three
systems of the ghetto environment. More briefly, the
Roxbury Action Program has accrued significantly greater
benefits through employing the balanced growth strategy
(in its attempt to develop the Highland Park community),
than did the Tenants' Development Corporation through
its utilization of an unbalanced growth strategy to impact
the South End area.
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PERSPECTUS
During the Seventies there has been a shift in
perspective and a re-evaluation of government and the
national corporate structure's role in designing, directing
and controlling the purse-strings of local community
development efforts. The Nixon Administration has recently
introduced and supported legislation such as the proposed
v.Self-Determination Act of 1971" and the pending "Better
Communities Act". These proposals, if enacted, would
place billions of dollars in the hands of the local
communities for the express purpose of executing develop-
ment programs. The rationale behind the recommendations
is that communities should spent time and resources on
meeting local needs and producing results, as opposed
to merely attempting to meet the demands of Washington
in order to receive revenue. The availability of new
funds will offer new opportunities to the ghetto
development agents, as well as problems of another nature.
In light of these new developments, community-based
agents such as those analyzed in the case studies are
in actuality from a by-gone era where mass community
protest movements and intensive urban unrest served as
the spawning grounds for community-based operations. In
this sense, it is impossible to intentionally re-create
the climate or circumstances from which TDC and RAP emerged.
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Currently emerging programs such as Circle Associates
of Boston and the Bedford Stuyvesant Corporation in New
York have avoided the "conflict" route. In doing so,
they have also escaped many problems related to the
transition from "protest" to "development". These agents
have begun their activities from a more sound political
and economic base than in the past.
Greater funds and easier accessability will serve as
a stimulus for more ghetto communities to engage in program
action. This, in turn, should expand the variety of
alternative techniques implemented to improve conditions
in the central cities. Through a new trial and error process,
those more effective programs can be identified.
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